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Under the Direction of Sean Richey
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the role of extreme media (i.e. political talk radio and cable
news opinion shows) on the political attitudes of viewers and listeners. I investigate whether
extreme media has both positive and negative externalities for democratic citizenship. Specif-
ically, I use laboratory experiments, national survey data, and qualitative interviews to test
the impact of extreme media on viewers’ political knowledge, trust in government, efficacy,
and political tolerance. I use laboratory experiments in controlled settings to uncover the
impact of viewership on political knowledge, trust in government, and efficacy. I confirm
these lab findings with the national survey data, by using propensity score matching and
ordered probit models to demonstrate that exposure to extreme media produces political
knowledge and efficacy, but decreases trust in government. I further use process tracing to
ascertain the motivations individuals use to choose to view extreme media. Finally, through
subject interviews conducted as part of the self-selection portion via a 1 x 3 self-selection
experiment, I find subjects seek out entertaining media specifically from ideologically sim-
ilar outlets. This project advances the media and politics literature by demonstrating the
capacity for extreme media to alter political behavior, attitudes, and information processing.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Media in the United States
Media are an integral part of American politics (Cook, 1998). Indeed, the framers
of the Constitution were adamant that a free press be an essential aspect of their new
republic (Cook, 1998; Schudson, 2002). It is important to note that the framers were
concerned with a free press, as opposed to an objective press. There was not then, and is
not now, any requirement that the media be objective. As media evolved out of the 19th
Century’s era of partisan press the “norm of objectivity” was developed and advanced by
schools of journalism, which were also increasing in number and size into the 20th Century
(Ritchie, 1998; Schudson, 2001). Thus, the prevailing position at this time is for media
to fulfill their role as the facilitator of knowledge in a democratic society, the information
they provide should come from an objective position (Graber, 2004; Jamieson & Cappella,
2010; Schudson, 2001).
Objectivity is important for a two reasons. First, within the norm of objectivity, the em-
phasis is on the distribution of information rather than analysis (Schudson, 2001). Reporters
are nothing more than conduits through whom information travels, and any normative im-
plications derived from the information are provided by the consumer for themselves or by
the editorial person or staff of the news outlet (Graber, 1988; Schudson, 2002).1 The
second reason objectivity is important—building off of the first—is consumers can trust the
information they receive because they know the information is objective and fully vetted for
1Editorial persons and/or staff can come in many forms. Walter Cronkite, for instance, did not have an
overly large involvement or even the final say on the editorial staff at CBS when he began as the anchor for
their nightly newscasts. However, as he gained more control over the CBS newsroom, he gradually came to
be the final say on all editorial decisions. Thus, the frame of the news on CBS gradually became the frame
Cronkite personally wanted (Ritchie, 1998). Similarly, in news papers, non-objective editorials are clearly
marked in their own section outside of the objective news (Cook, 1998; Schudson, 2001).
2accuracy (Graber, 1988; Schudson, 2001, 2002). Theoretically, the ability to immediately
trust the information one receives should allow for quicker internalization and use for making
political decisions. Fundamentally, objectivity should help citizens to be better informed,
and it should help them make better, more accurate decisions for themselves.
The norm of objectivity is a distinctly modern phenomenon (Cook, 1998; Schudson,
2001). Despite the fact schools of journalism and industry practices both developed and
continue to advance the norm of objectivity there is increasing evidence the norm may
be eroding (Schudson, 2001). This erosion is cause for concern if the claims of objective
journalism and news reporting being the catalyst for normatively beneficial outcomes like
political knowledge and trust in government are, in fact, true. Political talk radio (PTR) is
continually blamed for being part of an “echo chamber” that neither informs nor produces
positive political action (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010). One of the reasons PTR is supposedly
so problematic is its distinctly non-objective information dissemination. Hosts on PTR
outlets use their personal biases to present information to their listeners which may skew
the amount of objective information their listeners encounter (Barker, 2002). These same
accusations are currently being leveled against other burgeoning opinionated news forms
such as personality-based news shows on evening cable news channels (see Sobieraj & Berry,
2011).
The growing concern about non-objective news raises a question: Is it true that opinion-
based news shows—on both television and radio—are not as able as more traditional forms of
news to produce the kinds of benefits democratic societies require? The lack of objectivity in
some areas, contrary to the positions of some, need not imply that media are no longer able to
perform all their important democratic functions. Indeed, it may the case that non-objective
media, with a distinct point-of-view, are able to attract viewers who might otherwise not
engage with news of any sort. We know that this happens with soft news (Baum, 2003a,
2003b), and that the information soft news viewers get is beneficial in terms of increased
political knowledge (Baum & Jamison, 2006a). What has not yet been investigated are the
ways non-objective cable news programs may encourage these same benefits such as political
3knowledge, political trust, efficacy, or political tolerance. If it is the case that non-objective
media are able to produce desirable attitudes and skills like increased political knowledge—
or at least they can do so just as well as traditional media—the concerns some have raised
about non-objective media may be eased. However, missing from the discussion to this point
is the capacity for media to affect attitude change at all.
1.2 Literature on Media Bias
The literature on media and their role in American politics is a well-worn area of study.
The evolution of the literature begins with the debates between Lippmann (1922) and Dewey
(1927) who debated the role and capacity of citizens in democracy. Lippmann claims that
media support the power structure with propaganda, while Dewey argues that media and
technology have a educative capacity over time. Others argue that, in fact, the Lippmann-
Dewey debate places too much emphasis on media. Media effects on vote choice or opinion
generally are minimal (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Klapper, 1960). The
fundamental reason media have minimal effects is due to selective exposure and cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Klapper, 1960). However, others claim the effects of media—
to the extent there are any—happen on the margins, and occurs at different rates depending
on education or attention to media (Graber, 1988). This dissertation proposal sides with
this third view; media effects are real, but they are present under specific circumstances.
This should be particularly so with the type of media investigated here: extreme media.
Extreme media are likely to elicit stronger reactions than mainstream media, but psy-
chological processes (i.e. dissonance and/or motivated reasoning) will mitigate some effects
of these extreme media. However, because extreme media are also likely to produce affective
reactions as well, individuals who are confronted with extreme media will be affected by the
content subtly. For instance, it is highly unlikely that a liberal who watches Sean Hannity
will become conservative; however, it might be the case that after watching Sean Hannity a
liberal may distrust the government more than liberals who do not watch Sean Hannity.2
2Barker (2002) tests political trust among Rush Limbaugh listeners. The problem is that Barker’s work
4While the idea of biased media or the possibility that media can be biased is not a
recent phenomenon (Cook, 1998; Schudson, 2002) research on the effects of these biased
or extreme media are varied with regard to their results and conclusions. Furthermore,
the definition of “bias” is debated in the literature, and there is limited—and now dated—
research on media outside of the mainstream.3 Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt (1998) show
that mainstream media4 are balanced when covering presidential candidates, however, those
who pay the least attention to politics are the most likely to perceive their candidate as
having biased coverage. Dalton et al. (1998) claim that this is likely due to the “us vs. the
media” frame used by modern presidential candidates. Baum and Jamison (2006b) also note
the importance of attention with regard to soft media. They show that those who are less
attentive generally are more likely to vote consistently (i.e. vote correctly (Lau & Redlawsk,
2006)) when they watch soft news like The Daily Show or Oprah rather than hard news like
the typical six o’clock news program. Prior attention and interest in politics and news, then,
is a crucial aspect when theorizing about media effects.
While Dalton et al. (1998) research focuses on perceived bias, how might one measure
actual bias and what effect does actual bias have on consumers? There are two types of bias
outlined in the literature at this time. One is a negative-positive coverage bias (i.e., Dalton et
al., 1998). The other type of bias in use throughout the literature is liberal-conservative bias,
however, measuring this type of bias is done through proxy. Groseclose and Milyo (2005)
and Ho and Quinn (2008) measure the bias of media. Groseclose and Milyo’s measures are
based on A.D.A. scores, which are calculated by taking the ideological position of the think
tanks, interest, and policy groups cited by news agencies, and then cross-referencing those
citations with the citations of the same groups by members of Congress. The result is an
adjusted A.D.A. score that Groseclose and Milyo take as a measure of media bias. They
is based only on Rush Limbaugh, and is now dated. Thus, new work is needed to test newer media and
media personalities.
3I define “mainstream” media as the newscast proper on ABC, NBC, CBS, Fox, CNN, or MSNBC.
Talent-driven programming such as Sean Hannity, Rachel Maddow, or Ed Shultz is defined as biased.
4Dalton et al. use news reports, editorial reports, and nightly television reports. These are commonly
understood as bastions of “objective press.” These will not be the foci of this project.
5claim that all of the media outlets in their dataset are biased toward the liberal direction
except for the Washington Times. Another measurement strategy is put forth by Ho and
Quinn who measure the ideological position of newspapers using editorials and estimating
Martin and Quinn (M.Q.) (2002)-like scores. Ho and Quinn use the M.Q. of the newspapers
and match them to current Supreme Court justices, which enables a unidimensional space
for placing newspapers’ ideology.
There are three important points to make about these measures before considering new
research in this area. First, the Groseclose and Milyo measurement is purely a proxy for the
frequency of appearance by interest groups and think tanks. Secondly, Groseclose and Milyo
look at organizations as a whole, while it is probably more important to determine who among
the on-air talent is more or less conservative/liberal, and the extremity of their positions.
The third point is that the Ho and Quinn measurement is looking only at newspapers.
Newspapers, while certainly migrating to on-line content, are rapidly losing their position
as the primary news source in American politics. Nonetheless, these measures successfully
demonstrate that there is bias in media, and that these biases need to be taken into account
when considering how media affect political behavior.
Beyond directly measuring bias, researchers have investigated the effect of clearly dis-
similar news, and the types of individuals who select into those types of news (Prior, 2007).
Selective exposure is an unavoidable in the current media environment in the United States
(Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). No longer do citizens choose from the “Big 3” nightly newscasts,
which were typically sharing the same information. Citizens can now choose from NBC, CBS,
ABC, as well as MSNBC, CNN, Fox News, or myriad other news organizations high up the
cable listings.5 Selective exposure research confirms that ideology is a significant predictor
of selecting into media outlets (Stroud 2008). Iyengar and Hahn (2009) find that conserva-
tives are significantly more likely to select into Fox News information. Using an experiment,
5CurrentTV, HD Net, and Al Jazeera are but three of the newer news organizations Americans might
encounter. Each of these networks prides themselves on investigative journalism, which may increase their
market share in the coming years. Additionally, CurrentTV is direct in their message that they are a left-of-
center news organization as emphasized in the hiring of Keith Olbermann after his departure from MSNBC,
and the hiring of liberal politicans like Jennifer Granholm and Elliot Spitzer.
6Iyengar and Hahn randomly assign Fox, CNN, NPR, or BBC brands to AP stories. In each
treatment conservatives (or Republicans when used as the independent variable) selected
into and believed the Fox News story at higher rates than non-Fox News stories. Iyengar
and Hahn also point out this phenomenon is the reason MSNBC turned in an explicitly
anti-Fox News direction in 2006.
The primary dependent variables in this dissertation will be political attitudes and qual-
ities like political trust and political knowledge, but also evaluations of the content itself to
understand how these clearly ideological media affect attitudes such as political tolerance.
Political attitudes are—without question—supremely important for understanding how citi-
zens behave in democracy. Research demonstrates that education, attention, and the type of
media environment (i.e. television vs. newspapers) are crucial when modeling media effects
on these dependent variables (Jerit, Barabas, & Bolsen, 2006). More specifically, Jerit et al.
(2006) find that those with lower levels of education learn more political information through
television through an on-line learning process. The opposite is true for those with higher
levels of education; they learn more from newspapers. Jerit et al. make a compelling case for
differentiating expectations for political knowledge based on the information environment.
More generally we know that political knowledge and political trust are important qualities
that can be affected by media (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Hetherington, 1998). Per-
plexingly, however, none of these traits have been explained using biased or extreme media
as the independent variable. This dissertation will undertake that objective.
A primary aspect of human behavior is psychology. Human beings have myriad cognitive
processes that affect information processing and learning. Two of these, cognitive dissonance
and motivated reasoning, are particularly important when assessing learning via media.
Cognitive dissonance theory is states that human beings ignore information that is dissonant
to their prior held views but recall those that conform to their prior views (Festinger, 1957).
Motivated reasoning is the process by which individuals rationalize new information to make
it conform to those prior beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Affect is important to these
processes as well because each piece of information individuals encounter contains a piece
7of affective information as well (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). Research shows
that political beliefs are difficult to change, even when they are objectively wrong (Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010). However, over time, there can be an “affective tipping point” after which
one will reevaluate their beliefs, but this tipping point has a long time horizon (Redlawsk
et al., 2010). Despite these barriers to change, some research suggests that some media are
able to affect opinions and values.
Kim and Vishak (2008) show that “soft news” or entertainment political programming is
more successful than “hard news” or traditional political programming at facilitating political
knowledge. Kim and Vishak claim this is the case because entertainment media encourage
on-line processing, while traditional media encourage memory based recall (Lodge, McGraw,
& Stroh, 1989). Thus, Kim and Vishak, in addition to Jerit et al. (2006), Baum (2003b),
and Prior (2007) all suggest that entertainment and traditional media can help citizens learn
and affect attitudes. Mutz and Reeves (2005) and Mutz (2007) demonstrate that incivility
on television can lower trust, but can encourage citizens to consider other viewpoints. This
dissertation will add to this literature by adding the ways extreme media can affect citizens.
1.3 Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation is composed of six chapters, including Chapter 1—the introduction.
The second chapter is a qualitative analysis of the reasons individuals may select into their
media choices. Recent research demonstrates that self-selection is a concern in the 21st
Century media environment (Dilliplane, 2011; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2010). Missing from
these recent studies is an in-depth analysis of the motivations individuals have for choosing
the media selections they do. Using a 1 x 3 self-selection design, I delve into the complex
choices viewers make and the reasons for those choices. This chapter informs the development
of the hypotheses in the following chapters.
In Chapter 3, I examine the degree to which political knowledge is generated via extreme
media. The current state of the literature suggests that political knowledge would not follow
from watching extreme media because it does not provide information in a manner conducive
8to learning nor does it present information in a balanced way (Barker, 2002; Jamieson &
Capella, 2010; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). I challenge this assumption and demonstrate
that, in fact, extreme media can produce political knowledge, and that they are at least
as informative as more traditional news sources like PBS. I utilize experiments and cross-
sectional data to account for concerns with endogeneity and causality.
In Chapter 4, I address the effect extreme media have on political trust and efficacy. Like
knowledge, there is a general—un-tested—assumption in the literature that extreme media
will be detrimental to political trust (i.e., Barker, 2002; Jamieson & Capella, 2010). Using
propensity score matching on cross-sectional data across four presidential election years I
successfully show that the effect of extreme media on political trust and efficacy is more
nuanced than previously discussed. Furthermore, I am able to test the effect of different
media—radio and television—on these dependent variables. I find that the macro-political
environment is an important factor to take into account when thinking about how media
affect trust and efficacy.
The last empirical chapter examines the effect of extreme media on political tolerance.
Thus far, media effects on tolerance have shown mixed results. Given the emphasis on the
possibly detrimental effects of extreme media, political tolerance is an attitude that should
suffer if these media are normatively problematic. Using two different experimental designs,
I find that tolerance is not significantly affected by extreme media. The remainder of this
chapter is devoted to an explication of why these finding—though null—should instruct
conceptualization of extreme media effects in the future.
I conclude this project with a discussion on the implications of the research contained
in this document, and how these area of research should be continued in the future. Extreme
media—as a genre—are new, so continually evolving theories to test and methods to use to
study these media are important. I also place extreme media in context as an evolution of
the partisan press that was so prevalent in United States’ history. The fact is that those who
seek to use extreme language and tactics to gain market share and spread their ideology are
not as original they would like to believe; rather it is that our collective memories are not
9good enough to remember a time before the golden age of the “Big 3” (Schudson, 2002).
For too long scholars have painted with a broad brush when considering the effect(s) of these
media. Like so many other areas of media effects, extreme media are nuanced in their effects
across time and persons. The primary goal of this project is to highlight some of these




THE DETERMINANTS OF EXTREME MEDIA SELECTION
2.1 Introduction
Why do people select the media they do? What are their reasons, and how do attitudinal
characteristics play into their selection? These research questions are investigated with this
empirical chapter. The need to investigate these questions is evident given the increasingly
polarized media environment Americans currently inhabit (Prior, 2007). From the earliest
literature on media in American politics, scholars have assumed that people choose media
and information that reaffirms what they already know or think they know (Berelson et al.,
1954; Klapper, 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948). This school of thought
gave rise to the “minimal effects” hypothesis where media do not cause any effect per se but
rather reinforce already held beliefs. Over time, the minimal effects hypothesis receded into
the background as media effects expectations were honed and defined. In the intervening
50 years, framing, priming, and agenda setting literatures have shown media effects to be
not only real, but robust (Graber, 1988, 2004). Yet, as media become more prolific in their
capacity to be everywhere at all times, scholarship suggests we may be on the verge of a new
minimal effects era (W. L. Bennett & Iyengar, 2008a).
The culprit of this new era is self-selection (W. L. Bennett & Iyengar, 2008a; Stroud,
2010). Fifty years ago, Americans had three television channels, each with their own news
organization, but also competing for the same audience. Thus, even if one wanted to avoid
the news it was almost impossible to avoid it completely. This is no longer the case. As Prior
(2007), points out, depending on your television provider and media package one could watch
news from around the world at every moment of the day, or one could watch cartoons from
cradle-to-grave. The media environment is polarized, but it is also exponentially growing
(Sobieraj & Berry, 2011).
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In this chapter I investigate the factors that predict self-selecting into extreme partisan
media. I use a combination of empirical significance tests, as well as qualitative interviews
with experimental subjects to investigate the deeper reasons behind the selection of extreme
media versus non-extreme, non-partisan media. Using both an observational self-selection
study and randomly assigned laboratory experiment with the same media, I show that there
are factors other than partisanship that predict the media choices people make. This chapter
demonstrates that psychological effects are also at work, which is a novel and heretofore
untested aspect of the self-selection literature.
2.2 The Political Media Environment and Self-Selection
The American public find themselves in an increasingly polarized media environment
(Prior, 2007). Polarization is problematic because it produces the capacity to select into
media that confirm one’s previously held worldview (Mutz & Mondak, 2006; Prior, 2007).
The result is a situation where conservatives select into conservative media, and liberals
select into liberal media never having to hear the other side or encounter contrary opin-
ions. However, this is not the first time the American political system has been coupled
with an increasingly opinionated press. Indeed, until the 20th century, the American press
was distinctly partisan (Schudson, 2001, 2002). The difference in today’s more polarized
environment is that citizens are increasingly isolated from one another in other ways as well,
which means that society as a whole is becoming more polarized.
Americans are becoming more polarized ideologically (Abramowitz, 2010). As the
ideological “center” of American politics shrinks citizens are looking toward their media to
affirm their belief systems. Whereas at one time media could create an impersonal “other”
to increase political tolerance (Mutz, 1998), today we see that social networks and media
choice are becoming increasingly homogeneous (Mutz & Mondak, 2006; Stroud, 2008).
The development of “echo chambers” is thought to have a depressing effect on civic engage-
ment (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010). If citizens are not introduced to information contrary
to their own beliefs they will not be compelled to act politically. Mutz’s (2006) work on
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social networks suggest this might not be the case as homogeneous social networks breed
participation, while heterogeneous networks breed political tolerance and inactivity. These
cross-cutting political attachments present significant challenges for political participation,
and this is especially so in a polarized media environment.
There is not uniform commitment to the notion that selective exposure is a rampant
aspect of American political behavior. Kinder (2003) states that people do not often seek out
political information on the sole basis of partisan attachment or direction. Kinder takes on
the notion put forward earlier by Klapper (1960) and Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) that citizens
simply affirm the already held beliefs. In their localized surveys, Klapper and Lazarsfeld
and colleagues note that self-selection is particularly an issue with newspapers. Graber
(2004) highlights that newspapers are no longer the dominant source of information for most
American citizens. Television has exceed newspapers, and—in fact—political talk radio is
increasingly the source for millions of American’s political news (Berry & Sobieraj, 2011).
2.3 Observational Procedures
Assessing the reasons behind media selection is difficult. Survey responses could be
biased in ways that may not reflect reality. Thus, I initiate an experimental environment
where subjects are incentivized to choose their media choices similarly to real life. This study
is conducted with a convenience sample of American Government undergraduate students
at a large southeastern research institution. In total, 194 students participated in return for
extra credit on their final exam. These subjects were told they would be part of a research
study that would take place online, and that they would need a good internet connection.
When subjects entered the environment they were asked to answer a series of political
opinion, attitude, and demographic questions. Once they completed those questions, they
were then prompted to take a break. After their break, they were instructed that they should
read the next screen very carefully. The screen informed participants that they would get
a portion of their extra credit just for participating. However, to get their full extra credit
they would have to select a media choice and answer questions correctly after viewing their
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media selection. This was done to incentivize the subjects as they might be incentivized
in real life. This also follows other research that primes effort to mimic real-life pressure
to make good choices in elections or informational choices (i.e., Lau and Redlawsk 2006).
Subjects were offered three media choices. They appeared on the screen in the following
manner, “MSNBC: Countdown with Keith Olbermann,” “FOX News: Glenn Beck,” and
“PBS: NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.” These media personalities were chosen because of their
ideological direction. Countdown with Keith Olbermann is a distinctly liberal show, Glenn
Beck is a distinctly conservative show, and NewsHour with Jim Lehrer is shown to have no
discernable ideological orientation or bias (Dilliplane, 2011).
The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate the reasons behind the selection of
certain types of media. Stroud (2010) and Dilliplane (2011) show compelling evidence that
partisanship is a significant predictor of selecting into ideologically oriented news. What is
less clear, however, is if people believe they will get good information from their choices. The
literature, as previously discussed, suggests that citizens may be more interested in avoid-
ing discordant information than gaining useful information through their selection (Taber &
Lodge, 2006). So, there is reason to see if people who select into these media truly believe
that they are going to get the information they need to make the best decisions. Addition-
ally, I test a series of logit models estimating the likelihood of selecting into media. I find
that, in line with previous literature, partisanship is a significant predictor for selecting into
conservative media, but not for liberal or non-partisan media.
2.4 Data
Table 2.1 contains a summary of the data. As demonstrated, the selection among the
194 subjects was distributed throughout the sample into nearly thirds.
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Table 2.1 Self-Selection Subjects’ Demographics and Ideology
Variable Beck (83) Olbermann (63) PBS (49)
Conservative 27 4 9
Moderate 31 27 17
Liberal 24 31 22
Republican 24 4 7
Democrat 39 38 19
White 23 21 17
Black 42 32 17
Latino 13 10 8
2.5 A Qualitative Investigation of Self-Selection into Partisan Media
2.5.1 How to Choose in Light of the Objective?
The first question asked to subjects1 in their post-selection is, “Which video selection
did you choose, and why did you feel that it would help you gain all of your extra credit?”
There are discernable themes representing the answers to this question by each of the three
groups. Those who chose the non-partisan, non-extreme PBS clip all point its non-partisan
nature as the reason for their choice. For instance, one subject states, “The PBS one. Keith
Olbermann and Glen [sic] Beck discuss the news in an openly biased way. It’d be more logical
to receive news from a news anchor less concerned with advancing a particular ideology.”
This particular sentiment is echoed over and over again by those who selected into this
choice. It is clear that there is desire for objectivity for those who selected into PBS, but
what is important is that there is also a repository of knowledge about Olbermann and Beck
being partisan. Highlighting this repository of knowledge about the other media sources,
one subject says, “I chose the PBS video because it’s a public station that usually doesn’t
have it’s own agenda. The Glenn Beck video was definitely out of the question because the
FOX network, as well as Beck, is very one sided and can be a bit extreme.” This subject not
only references their own desire for non-partisan news, but actually notes Beck as “extreme,”
1All of the subjects are anonymous, and their statements are taken verbatim from the on-line study
environment.
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which suggests more that just being partisan.
The desires of the subjects who chose FOX News are somewhat different than the
subjects who chose PBS. There are almost no references to the purported objectivity of
FOX News. One subject is clear in their preferences, “Being a Conservative, Catholic,
Republican- Fox News would be my obvious pick. Watching Fox News, I would be move [sic]
interested in watching the whole 3mins [sic].” This subject clearly knows that FOX News is
ideologically conservative, and they know that they will get the information they want to
hear from FOX News. Another expresses a similar opinion for their selections stating, “Fox
news, and I felt that this media choice would help me gain all of my extra credit because I am
a conservative Republican and Fox news has a tendency to view the news in a conservative
way, which is what I support.” These views are typical of the subjects who selected into
FOX News in this study. The known ideological direction of FOX News is clearly a major
motivation for those who are selecting into FOX News.
Like FOX News, MSNBC’s Keith Olbermann also benefits from those who know the
ideological direction of the host. Unlike PBS, where subjects were seeking objectivity, neither
FOX News nor MSNBC selecting subjects mentioned objectivity. One subject who selected
into MSNBC says,“MSNBC–although it leans to the left and can report some issues with
biased opinions, I regularly watch MSNBC for my news. I have never watched PBS, and
FOX news is just ridiculous.” This subject notes the ideological slant of MSNBC-though
they do not state liberal or conservative-and claims that they use MSNBC for their news
most of the time. This subject does not mention objectivity as a requirement of their
selection as those who selected into PBS did quite often. In this way, FOX News viewers
and MSNBC viewers are similar, but with different ideological references. Another subject
states, “Countdown with Keith Olbermann on MSNBC. I chose this media choice because
Glenn Beck is a fool and too extreme for my political opinions, and PBS is boring. I
like the middle ground, slightly leftist approach Keith generally takes.” By highlighting
both PBS and Glenn Beck this subject not only clearly explicates their knowledge that
Olbermann is partisan, and that his being “leftist” is something desirable. One aspect of
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these news programs that is left out of the self-selection literature, but is discussed in the
“soft news” literature is the entertainment value of Beck and/or Olbermann. Baum (2003a,
2003b) suggests that Bill O’Reilly, who shares his genre with Beck and Olbermann, might
be classified as “infotainment.” This is something apart from hard or soft news, where the
viewers tune in for a hard news-like program, but are also entertained in the process. One
subject claims this is why they chose MSNBC by saying, “I chose the MSNBC video because
that’s simply what I’m used to watching. I know how biased Fox News is and I do not enjoy
watching it. And although PBS is probably the most informative of the three, it’s content
is usually very dry and dull—not entertaining at all.” The prompt for the selection was to
get questions correct and earn all the possible extra credit, but even under these high-stakes
instructions it seems that some subjects were unwilling to forego perceived entertainment on
the way to being informed.
2.5.2 Was the Information Informative?
The second in-depth question asked subjects if they felt that the video they selected
gave them the information they needed to answer the questions, and how they felt about
the presentation of the information. In the PBS selecting subjects, there is a relative con-
sensus that the presentation was “dry” or “boring.” One subject states, “I felt the video was
uninformative, maybe because of the delivery of the video. I am not into politics myself, so
that may be another reason why the video was uninteresting. I do feel the video gave me a
little information though.” Of all of the PBS selecting subjects, this subject is the only one
who mentions that the video was uninformative. However, even after stating that the video
was uninformative—likely due to its “boring” delivery—they close by saying that they did
obtain “a little information.” Other than this one subject, the general theme emerging from
these responses is that PBS is informative, if somewhat dry, and useful.
Subjects’ judgments of usefulness of FOX News’s Glenn Beck are somewhat more mixed
than PBS. Where PBS was almost uniformly considered informative but uninteresting, Beck
is noted as entertaining by a number of subjects. A subject states, “it [Beck] was quite
17
entertaining not really informative.” Along similar lines, another subject says, “I felt that
the media choice i [sic] chose was informative, but the humor was a little bit more emphasized
than was the actual facts of the news story of what was happening in Arizona.” There is
some evidence that using humor or engaging in entertainment generally is good for helping
people acquire information (Kim & Vishak, 2008). In his clip, Beck goes into detail with
the text of Senate Bill 1070 and discusses how the bill can only be considered harmful if
one plans on doing pernicious activities in the first place. He frames his support of the bill
as a law-and-order or support of police frame. One Republican-identifying subject claims
that this was helpful and informative claiming, “Yes. This video informed me a lot. It
explained why everyone who thought is was wrong was misinformed.” Beck’s explanation
of the issue is perceived to be one sided, but this does not appear to take away from the
perceived effectiveness of his clip. A statement by an ideologically moderate Democrat shows
the ways ideology and partisanship might affect who subjects interact with the information.
On the question of usefulness they state, “somewhat, he [Beck] was single sided and only
explained one side of the issue.” There is a clear divide between those who felt Beck’s
presentation of information on Senate Bill 1070 was useful. Conservatives felt that Beck’s
delivery was useful, while those who were moderate or identified as Democrats generally had
more negative comments. Almost no liberals selected into Beck, which follows the previous
literature on self-selection (Dilliplane, 2011; Stroud, 2008). However, of the few who did,
their comments mirror this slightly liberal male’s comments,
Like I already answered in the previous answer, the show [Beck] gets pieces of
what the president said reinforcing negative information for the president. Their
[sic] might be lots of reason for that, but the main one is because they are trying
to push you towards picking a republican candidate. Now, it could also be that
the president also knows that their [sic] is corruption and it actually happens
with the example of immigrants being coerced by cops if they are buying ice
cream, but since those immigrant probably don’t even know they have personal
rights and liberties they don’t speak or fight it in court. I felt as if the show was
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somewhat informative, but not all details described.
This person obviously feels that the show is informative to a degree, but—as a liberal—
feels like there is important information left out, and does not like the framing of the issue
generally. Yet, even here with this hard case, Beck is still considered somewhat informative.
As demonstrated in the summary statistics table above, this convenience sample of
college students is generally liberal. This means that, on the whole, we should see more
uniformity on the informative nature of the MSNBC Olbermann clips. The general consensus
establishes that to be the case. Of the 63 people who selected into MSNBC, most of them
felt that Olbermann’s portrayal of Senate Bill 1070 was informative, and gave them the
information they thought they would need to answer the questions correctly. A moderate who
selected into Olbermann felt that his portrayal of Senate Bill 1070 was very fair saying, “I feel
the media choice I made gave me the information I needed because it displayed a controversial
topic and demonstrated a positive, less biased opinion on the topic of the Senate Bill 1070
in Arizona.” Yet, there were some who felt like Olbermann had an emotionally driven frame
to his reporting. One subject states, “It wasn’t unnecessarily uninformative, because it was
emotionally charged, which took away from actually learning information.” This comment
elucidates the fact that—like Beck with humor—Olbermann seeks to engage his viewers
in affective states that will keep them viewing his show (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). The
literature of affective intelligence is mixed with regard to which emotions producing higher
learning states or inhibiting them (Brader, 2006; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Redlawsk et
al., 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Even among those who though that Olbermann was
informative, there is still a perception of bias. A liberal Democrat says, “I thought it was
really informative, but bias [sic].” The claims of bias for both Olbermann and Beck abound,
but they do not seem to significantly detract from the perceived usefulness of the hosts or
the clips. Only when viewers are of opposing ideological directions to the host is there some
indication that they video was uninformative.
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2.5.3 Explicit Perceptions of Bias and Attitude Change
The third question asked of subjects was, “Do you feel that the clip was biased in any
way toward one side of the immigration debate? Did that affect your opinion of the video
or immigration?” This question is asked to gauge the degree to which subject felt there
was explicit bias in the information provided. Furthermore, it is necessary to ascertain if
their media selection was capable of changing their opinions about immigration. Opinion
change is a multi-faceted cognitive process, but most Americans do not have very ingrained
ideas about political topics in general (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Zaller, 1992). However, it
could be the case that opinions of ideologically opposing view—of the few who selected into
ideologically opposing hosts—may resist opinion or attitude change. In fact, they may expe-
rience “anchoring” where they become more ardent in their previously held beliefs (Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010).
On the question of explicit bias and opinion change there is a large degree of uniformity
in the answers provided by the subjects. On PBS, a significant amount of objectivity is
perceived according to the responses to this question. Subjects note that PBS attempted to
give both sides of the issue (pro-immigration and pro-S.B. 1070) a fair platform from which
they could share their position. A moderate Democrat who selected into PBS states,
Not really, it seemed pretty fact-based, rather than bias-driven. It showed the
Republican Governor’s point of view, as well as the President’s. I wish it had
included some more about local opinion in Arizona, but for a four minute clip,
it was pretty fair. It didn’t especially affect my opinion one way or the other.
Highlighting the facts and the even-sided nature of the coverage on PBS, this subject feels
as though their opinion is unchanged by the clip. The overwhelming majority of subjects
claimed that their opinions were not changed by the clips. This confirms the hypothesis
stemming from the self-selection literature that people do not select into media in an effort
to change their opinion. Even in the event that they find information that is contrary to their
opinion they are able to convert it into information that helps maintain their previously held
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beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006). However, among those who selected into PBS with the most
polarized ideological or partisan perspectives, even PBS is not outside the purview of “bias.”
A strongly conservative Republican says of their PBS selection, “I actually felt that it had a
bit of a democratic/liberal [sic] bias but that might only be because I am a republican [sic].”
However, strong liberals felt similarly, but in the opposite direction. A liberal Democrat says
the following of the PBS clip,
It was biased more on the Republican side if immigration and did not show much
of the Democratic side. So, I was lead to take the opinion that this Bill was a
good idea with very few faults, when there might actually be a better way of
figuring out how to work with the US, and Arizona, illegal immigration problem.
These comments from the ideological extremes demonstrate the ways the exact same in-
formation, understood through different ideologically driven cognitive processes, results in
wildly divergent understandings of the bias of media. Taken with the earlier quote from
a moderate, we see that establishing bias in even an objectively non-partisan source is a
slippery slope.
Unlike PBS, FOX News’s Glenn Beck and MSNBC’s Countdown with Keith Olbermann
are decidedly more partisan. Regardless of the subject’s ideological orientation, there is
universal agreement that Beck was biased toward the Republican bill and that Olbermann
is biased against the bill. Both of these positions would match their ideological perspectives.
A Republican moderate, for instance, states, “Yes I feel it was a little biased. I think that
Beck favored the law, he sees it as something that is fair and does not really harm the people
and that it is not unfair. This did not affect my own opinion.” This person is of the same
partisan orientation as Beck, but is able to pick out the bias in Beck’s statements. They also
claim that their attitude is not changed. Another Republican subject states,
Yes, the video clip did have a conservative bias supporting the fact that immi-
gration papers are rarely checked anywhere in the United States and should be.
This only strengthened my opinion about the law because I am a Republican and
support news that has a somewhat conservative bias.
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This statement shows that Beck was able to reaffirm the previously held belief of the subject,
and that the subject viewed Beck as bringing out facts and truth.
Liberals who selected into Beck also claim their attitude is unchanged after watching
the clip, but this is likely for a different reason. One liberal claims, “[Y]es, the video was very
bias [sic]. [T]he video focused more on law enforcement decision and justification for those
decision. As a liberal I have to go with the side of humans’ right [sic], and discrimination is
clearly at play for who the police officers choose to investigate.” This subject references the
fact that Beck suggests the only way Senate Bill 1070 could go wrong was if the police are
totally irresponsible. Again, his is a law-and-order frame used to justify the expanded power
for police. Even moderates catch on to this frame and suggest that it is biased toward the
bill. This moderate Democrat says of Beck’s frame, “Slightly biased because just because
authorities say they won’t ask for papers from an individual without prior breaking the law
in some way does not mean that all authorities will go by the books and abide at all times.”
Obviously, Beck’s insistence that the law is justified because we can trust the police does
not abate concerns this subject may have; although, they claim that his presentation is only
“slightly biased.”
Claims of bias are also leveled at MSNBC’s Olbermann. Once again, as with Beck
before, I expect that ideologically like-minded subjects who select into Olbermann will not
have their opinion changed, nor should ideologically opposed individuals. This is because of
cognitive dissonance and motivated skepticism (Festinger, 1957; Taber & Lodge, 2006).
The following statement is from a strong liberal Democrat, “Yes, it [the clip] was biased
against the anti-immigration bill. It did not affect my opinion because I expected that
reaction from this news source.” This person knows that Olbermann is the person they want
to use as their source for information because they know what to “expect.” As a liberal,
they likely knew that he would feed their affective need to be reaffirmed. Furthermore, their
opinion was unchanged because it was merely reaffirmed. There are a host of other liberals
who answered similarly for this question. Like conservatives with Beck, liberals knew what
to expect with Olbermann and went there to get it. On the tone of the clip, a moderate
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Democrat had this to say,
Yes, the news swayed more towards the liberal’s point of view. The information
they showed about the conservatives made the conservatives look horrible and
selfish individuals. The liberals on the other hand were viewed as more of a
likable [sic] individuals. I’m already against the Arizona act before viewing this
video, so my opinion didn’t really change because of it.
This person is not strongly ideological, but did identify as a Democrat. As demonstrated by
their statement, they were already against the immigration bill when they selected into this
clip, and did not have their opinion change. Clearly, however, they detected a bias in the
information, as they say that conservatives are made to look “horrible” and “selfish.” These
subjects’ statements are indicative of the previous literature on self-selection, but give a
more in-depth understanding of how people interact with these media. The bias is clear, and
people recognize it. However, because of their cognitive defenses they are able to categorize
the information and use it to buttress their own position. The same goes for conservatives
who selected into Olbermann.
Of the few conservatives who selected into Olbermann, one has this to say about his
perceived bias and opinion change, “No, and no I still believe that we should protect our
borders.” This person was the only strong conservative to select into Olbermann. They do
not claim to perceive any bias, but that is likely because Olbermann’s clip presented both
sides of the argument. However, as the other slides note, he did so in a bias tone, so this
may be the result for this subject not perceiving distinct bias. However, on attitude change,
we see that this strong conservative believes that America should “still protect our borders.”
Thus, even though Olbermann takes a distinctly anti-S. B . 1070 point of view this subject’s
opinion remains unchanged. This fits with the previous discussion of both the other clips
and the existing literature.
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2.5.4 Examining Affect toward Extreme and Non-Ideological Media
The last question asked of the subjects was, “Finally, please describe your feelings toward
the host(s) in your video clip in how they approached and discussed this topic. Were they
able to inform the way you think about this issue?” The reason for this question was to probe
deeper into the effect on affective judgments of the hosts by the subjects. Having already
discussed if they though the host was informative or biased, I wanted to see if viewing these
hosts and then answering questions about what they watched resulted in more or less positive
judgments about the hosts. It is expected, as previously discussed, that ideological alignment
will make the judgments more positive, while selecting into a dissimilar ideological host will
create a negative reaction. PBS will have neither positive nor negative affect because it will
likely be perceived as less entertaining, but—as noted earlier—more informative.
The impressions subjects had about the PBS host were positive based on the host’s
moderate, fair manner. Subjects pointed to the two-sided presentation of Senate Bill 1070,
and how it was treated as a legitimate piece of legislation. Though, some took issue with the
tone of the piece. A slightly liberal Independent who selected into PBS stated, “He was kind
of boring but gave the news and facts as he should.” This sentiment is echoed by another
subject who said, “I honestly found it boring and therefore had trouble remembering some
of the information.” Despite these subjects who thought that the show was uninteresting,
some subjects appreciated the calm discussion on PBS. A liberal Democrat who selected into
PBS says,
I felt informed, but not necessarily that the speaker had any influence over my
emotional response to it. It felt like a dull class lecture, honestly, which, I suspect,
is part of why less people watch PBS than watch other news outlets. It’s less
biased, but also less interesting. They discussed it mildly and politely, and were
clearly geared toward being informative, rather than biasing the viewer one way
or the other. I appreciated that, even if I would have preferred to read the
information than watch it.
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This person suggests that the delivery made it more difficult to concentrate on the issue at
hand. They appreciated the non-biased nature of the clip, but might have enjoyed more
entertainment along the way. This impression of the fairness of the host is seconded even
by a conservative Republican who states, “The gentleman presiding over the PBS selection
handled the immigration debate in a very fair, moderate manner. The topic was discussed
very professionally and informed me more about the issue.” Regardless of the ideological
direction of the subject, the PBS selection is considered informative, if forgettable. This is
not the case for either Beck or Olbermann.
Both Beck and Olbermann were considered entertaining by the majority of the subjects
who selected into their clips. This adds another layer on top of Beck and Olbermann as
reasons for their success with their audiences. On top of being informative, they are also
entertaining. A moderate Republican says of Beck,
The host [Beck] made the news a little bit more entertaining because he was
humorous and funny as he covered the information. Rather than standing on
camera and giving a boring lecture about the news, he made it much more inter-
esting. Yes, they were able to inform the way I thought about the issue presented
in the news, and supported the way I viewed the issue.
Once again, we see that this like-minded partisan appreciates the way that Beck affirms
their worldview, but at the same time appreciates his delivery of the information. This
is important because research is emerging that claims entertainment is a key component
to increasing knowledge in polarized media environments (Kim & Vishak, 2008). Other
conservatives confirm this point with one stating, “I like Glenn Beck and listen to him
regularly, so the way he approached the topic was in line with my conservative beliefs anyway.
He was able to inform me the way I think about the issue.” Even among liberals, Beck was
considered at least mildly entertaining. One somewhat liberal subject says, “The host was
very extreme and passionate about the topic of the immigration law. He was able to inform
me the way in which I think about this issue.” This statement puts very simply that the
subject was able to learn something, and it can be inferred that they found Beck at least
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somewhat entertaining because he was “passionate.” They also say he was “extreme,” but
do not indicate that this was a problem for them. Other liberals were not so kind.
One slightly liberal subject said Beck “seems like a jerk.” Another moderate Democrat
had this to say about Beck’s presentation,
He started off the show horribly in my opinion because he immediately attached
Obama who is our nation’s leader. He did not inform me well on the issue but
tried harder to keep my attention by bending the truth and making it a joke.
It is clear from these comments, which are not bountiful, that there was some ideological
resistance to Beck’s “entertainment” as perceived by conservatives. However, at a minimum,
there is compelling evidence that Beck was considered more entertaining that PBS, and he
was considered by a majority to be informative as well. This suggests that Beck is able to
tap into some affective reserve among his viewers to keep help them understand political
issues.
Olbermann, too, seems to be able to tap into an affective well keeping his viewers
entertained and informed. A strong liberal who selected into Olbermann says the following
about his clip, “I felt that he was trying to be more entertaining than informative but he
expressed the way I think about the issue.” Responses to this question for Olbermann are
not as universal in their agreement about the entertainment factor as they are for Beck. This
may be due to Olbermann’s more “news-like” presentation of information, but it may also
be an artifact of the video treatments in this project. Nonetheless, even moderates felt that
there was some entertainment value to Olbermann with one stating, “I really enjoyed the
way the information was presented and the presenter, it was easy for me to understand.”
Some subjects did express dismay at the presentation of the Olbermann segments with one
moderate stating,
They were able to inform the news, but obviously the news is biased. If I want to
genuinely know about the Arizona law debate, I must go through the controversial
topic and do thorough research on the topic. That way, I can have my own opinion
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and know the information from both sides of the political party’s point of view
instead of relying on just one. The anchor obviously approached the republicans
[sic] as ruthless and evil, so I’m not going to truly rely on every word he states.
The republicans [sic] were only shown in a negative matter and the context of
what they showed was obviously biased as well. Due to that matter, I cannot
trust the news entirely.
Overall, both Beck and Olbermann are considered more “entertaining” with those who se-
lected into Beck mentioning it most often. The PBS clip was considered informative, but
the feelings toward the host were largely not mentioned, or they subjects said that they felt
neither good nor bad about the host. Beck and Olbermann are more effective at getting
emotional responses from the subjects in this study, which suggests emotion is one way they
are able to get their viewers’ attention. Those who took issue with the presentation of either
Beck or Olbermann did so from a position of either ideological heterogeneity, or they wanted
more information in the video.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter delves into the reasons behind self-selection into extreme political media
versus non-partisan media. The literature on self-selection suggests that partisanship is a
significant predictor of media selection. This study replicates that finding, but also probes
the subjects of this self-selection study to see what their objectives for their selection is. By
priming subjects to select based on an informational goal, mimicking real-life, I am able to
explore the quality of their decisions and the reasons behind them.
For Beck selectors, being conservative is a significant predictor, and entertainment is a
quality continually referenced post video exposure. Beck is also considered to be informative,
even among non-ideologically aligned viewers. His conservative bias is obvious, and is the
source of enjoyment for ideologically homogeneous selectors, but aversion for ideologically
heterogeneous selectors.
For Olbermann selectors, there is no significant ideological or partisan predictor based on
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logit models, but more liberals and Democrats select into Olbermann than not in this study.
Olbermann’s liberal bias is noted by his selectors, but is referenced as one of the reasons
the select into his video. Finally, his entertainment value is not a prevalently mentioned as
Beck’s but he is clearly more entertaining than the PBS clip. Most of his selectors also feel
that he presents information in a way that allows them to recall it later with ease.
The subjects who selected into PBS noted its non-partisan, moderate reputation as
one of the primary reasons most of them selected into this choice. Most participants said
they believed the information was fair and not biased, but also described it as boring or
unmemorable. Unlike the selectors to Beck and Olbermann, PBS was not effective at eliciting
emotional responses to its coverage of Senate Bill 1070 of Arizona. Theses descriptions of
PBS follow what the literature suggests is the case with this media outlet.
We now have a more in-depth understanding of the reasons and effects behind media
selection in the American political context. This study finds that, similar to previous re-
search, partisanship is a significant predictor for selecting into conservative media, but not
for other media. Neither PBS nor MSNBC selection were significantly predicted using at-
titudinal variables. Liberals seem to select MSNBC more, but not significantly more than
PBS. Importantly, this research suggests that emotional or affective dispositions are at play
when subjects consider the effect these media have on them. Furthermore, subjects seem
convinced that these media do not affect their attitudes toward immigration.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BENEFICIAL IMPACT OF EXTREME MEDIA ON POLITICAL
KNOWLEDGE
3.1 Introduction
Do “extreme” media produce political knowledge? Political knowledge is paramount for
democracy because the political knowledgeable are more engaged and make better decisions
(Althaus, 1998; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Gilens, 2001). This is an open question,
but one that is vital to answer. By the term extreme I mean those media using hyperbolic
language, ad hominem attacks, and generally bombastic confrontations to discuss politics
(Sobieraj & Berry, 2011).1 In this chapter I use both a laboratory experiment and an ordered
probit models on cross-sectional survey data to test the hypothesis that extreme television
media can generate political knowledge. For the experiment, I find that extreme media
treatments are positive and significantly correlated with increases in surveillance political
knowledge on immigration against a control group, and that these extreme media are at
least as informative as more traditional media such as PBS. Using the cross-sectional data for
external validity, I demonstrate that even while controlling for known predictors of political
knowledge and the partisan slant of media outlets and hosts, extreme media are positive and
significantly correlated with higher levels of civic-based political knowledge. This relationship
persists even when testing for partisan slant of the extreme media host. Television is not
the only medium with extreme political outlets, however, as political talk radio is likely the
medium with the most extreme hosts and content. To expand my finding to media generally,
I use American National Election Study and National Annenberg Election Survey data to
1Sobieraj and Berry (2011) use the term “outrageous” to describe these media. I feel that term does not
encompass a positional reference for these media compared to the more traditional evening broadcast news.
These new shows (i.e., Countdown with Keith Olbermann, Glenn Beck, or The Rachel Maddow Show are in
direct competition with the evening news, and therefore should be explained in reference to them. Compared
to the evening news or even shows like The Situation Room, these shows are extreme.
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perform propensity score matching models with political talk radio as the treatment and
political knowledge as the dependent variable. I find that political talk radio as a treatment
is significant for increased knowledge in three of four elections.
Recent scholarship suggests that “outrage” or extreme media are normatively bad for
American politics (Berry & Sobieraj, 2011; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011) and that they are on the
rise. Berry and Sobieraj (2011) claim that stations using political talk radio-a platform that
is classified almost uniformly “outrageous” or extreme-as their main format have increased
dramatically in the last 5 years (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Additionally, Berry and Sobieraj
(2011) find that extreme political television content is growing exponentially as well. It is
suggested that the reason for this growth is easy, low-cost production, and Americans’ desire
to discuss politics. In Post-Broadcast Democracy, Prior (2007) finds that increases in media
choices have affected the ways people access their news and information, and therefore their
behaviors as a result. Prior claims that differences in knowledge acquisition are exacerbated
by media polarization essentially making those who knowledgeable know more while those
who are unknowledgeable increasing less knowledgeable. Thus, the question becomes if
Americans are given increasing choices of political media coverage that are extreme in nature,
do these media actually produce a public good in the form of political knowledge?
Scholarship about new approaches to news and media affects is producing new
paradigms in media studies (Hansen & Kim, 2011). Researchers using theories developed
from traditional media are comparing new types of media such as hostile media, soft news,
and blogs (Baum, 2003a; Berry & Sobieraj, 2011; Hansen & Kim, 2011; Sobieraj &
Berry, 2011) to investigate the validity of these theories in today’s media environment. As
media evolve, this is an important task. If a new type of media-such as opinionated, extreme
television talk shows-changes how citizens interact with information about politics it has
important normative and policy implications.
This project fills a gap in this line of research. I posit that extreme media can positively
affect knowledge both directly and indirectly. The direct effect comes through extreme me-
dia’s constant discussion of political topics, which leads listeners to become more informed
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on basic political matters (see Baum, 2003a, 2003b; Luskin, 1990). Beyond this straight-
forward reason, there is a theoretical basis for an indirect effect through the creation of
emotional-cognitive stimuli-chiefly, anxiety (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007) but also
fear (Brader, 2006). Fear has been shown in the affective intelligence literature to promote
information searching and the eventual learning of political facts. By discussing topics in
ways that might encourage listeners fear and anxiety, extreme media may promote view-
ers to become informed. Thus, we can expect that viewers of extreme media will be more
knowledgeable because extreme media hosts often elicit fear (see Brader, 2006; Sobieraj
& Berry, 2011). With these theoretical bases, I hypothesize that extreme media creates a
positive externality in promoting political knowledge. I use the term “externality” because
that is exactly what political knowledge is in this circumstance. For example, apiaries desire
bees to make honey. However, the farmer next door receives the positive externality—an
unintended by-product—of his plants being pollinated. Similarly, Glenn Beck’s objective is
to entertain and make profits, but I hypothesize that a positive externality is their generating
a more knowledgeable citizenry.
3.2 Political Knowledge
Political knowledge is important for citizens because it shapes the ways in which citizens
engage in politics and make competent decisions (Althaus, 1998; Delli Carpini & Keeter,
1996; Gilens, 2001). Research clearly shows that citizens are both basically unknowledge-
able, and have trouble learning about political issues (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Bartels (1996, 2005, 2007) shows that citizens are often unable
to piece the policy implications of their opinions on political matters, and thus that their
low levels of political knowledge result in sub-optimal electoral outcomes.
There is little debate that political knowledge is a key component of democratic citi-
zenship (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). There is a debate,
however, about how the knowledge is structured. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) claim
that knowledge of civic-based facts is a legitimate way to measure knowledge, while Lupia
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and McCubbins (1998) typify those who claim that heuristics are enough to make citizens
knowledgeable even if they cannot recall specific facts (see also Popkin, 1991).
There is a “middle ground” of political knowledge that satisfies both sides of this debate:
surveillance knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006).
Civics learning could be considered a political activity itself, which makes it a questionable
metric for predicting political behavior. Additionally, heuristics can simply be wrong or
misunderstood on the part of citizens. We should, however, expect that when citizens are
presented with facts about current politics and policy that they would learn those facts. This
happens primarily through media (Graber 2001, 2004). Surveillance knowledge is important
because it is knowledge taken from the media environment and used to make political de-
cisions. Thus, if a person watches a story on a current political topic, we would expect
that person to be able to recall some factual information if media are doing their job. The
question then becomes: do extreme media teach effectively?
One issue concerning knowledge acquisition through extreme, partisan media is that
they may encourage or prime misperceptions about the policy they discuss. Misperceptions
are demonstrated to be persistent in highly detailed policy areas (Kuklinski et al. 2000), and
difficult to overcome (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). For example, research on Rush Limbaugh
listeners in the 1990s suggests that they were more likely than non-listeners to have misper-
ceptions about Clinton administration policy proposals (Barker 2002). Thus, extreme media
are a likely place for persistent or exacerbated misperceptions.
3.3 The Capacity for Media to Teach
Because citizens know very little about politics generally and typically put little effort
into researching it, a convenient and common place Americans get their information is the
news media (Graber, 2004). Television is a common place for citizens to get their political
information (Graber, 2001; Paletz, 2002). Baum (2003a, 2003b) demonstrates that even
consumption of “soft news” television can increase political knowledge. Importantly, Baum
and Jamison (2006b) show that this increase in political knowledge corresponds to real-world
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political activity. Voters who consume soft news vote correctly at higher levels than similar
voters who do not watch soft news.
Benefits from television are not uniform as this research highlights the discrepancies
between the lowest and highest educated in society (Baum, 2003a, 2003b; Graber, 1988;
Prior, 2003). Jerit et al. (2006) find that newspapers exacerbate differences in education
levels with the highest educated being able to recall more surveillance knowledge. Less
educated subjects are better able to use television to decrease the differences in knowledge
between the highest and lowest educated groups (Jerit et al., 2006). Prior (2007) also
claims there are issues with increased media polarization stating as media increasingly cater
to niche markets any benefits generated by media will also be corralled in those niches. Those
who consume extreme media, according to Prior, may be missing key pieces of information
needed to make informed decisions or acquire knowledge. Importantly, despite the differences
in treatment effects via media types, newspapers and traditional news media in these studies
are generally able to increase knowledge over pre-test or control conditions. What is less
clear, however, is if learning can happen in extreme media environments.
Learning can happen through extreme media because-in spite of the hosts’ ideological
predilections-discussions about policy and politicians constantly occur. Hosts like Glenn
Beck, Sean Hannity, or Ed Shultz are often biased in their discussion, but they still discuss
the most salient political topics of the day. For instance, on political talk radio—an entire
medium based on extremeness (Berry & Sobieraj, 2011)—personalities come from different
ideological positions, but they talk about policy issues and members of Congress or who
draw their ire. The healthcare debate in 2009 and 2010, for example, was the source of
countless hours of political talk radio (Chefets, 2010). During this debate, citizens who
would have otherwise never heard the names Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, or known anything
about Congressional procedure (conference committees or “deem-and-pass”) would have been
confronted with these people and terms. Thus, while opinions may be affected in a negative
way (see Barker, 2002), important political information is being dispensed to listeners.
Currently, there is little literature on the substantive effect of extreme media—particularly
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television —on political knowledge. Forgette and Morris (2006) test the effect of CNN’s
Crossfire—an early version of high conflict cable media-against CNN’s traditional State of
the Union broadcast on attitudes toward government officials and institutions. Subjects
watching Crossfire have lower evaluations compared to traditional broadcast viewers. In
short, consumers of extreme media have the motivation, opportunity, and the ability to
acquire and process political information (Luskin, 1990). There is reason to believe that
the effects of hostile media extend beyond attitudes toward the parties involved and extent
to knowledge acquisition.
Consumers of extreme media may also learn through this medium because it heightens
their emotional state through anxiety and fear. There is an increasing amount of scholarship
about emotional learning in political environments (see Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus, 2002).
While at one time reasoned, rational thought without emotions was considered to be the only
method of political learning and decision making, it is now clear that emotions are important
and perhaps necessary in decision making (Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus, 2002). Anxious
citizens are more likely to seek out information to increase their knowledge on political
topics. Psychologists demonstrate that emotions—specifically anxiety—can motivate people
to learn and retain information. Damasio (1994) and Eysenck (1992) both demonstrate that
anxiety can effectively motivate learning. Though anxiety can make learning less efficient
(Eysenck, 1992; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994) it nonetheless encourages information seeking
and attention.
Fear and anxiety are not the only possible motivating emotions. Positive emotions
such as enthusiasm are also important for learning. Research by Brader (2006) on the 2004
presidential election outlines how the Bush campaign advertisements were able to produce
both anxiety and enthusiasm. The results of these ads were that voters who viewed them
were both motivated to learn more about the campaign, and remembered more of what
they learned. Similarly, Marcus and Mackuen (1993) and Marcus (2002) find that positive
emotions can play important roles in information seeking and retention in election settings.
And since research shows that extreme media are often about creating anxiety or fear in
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viewers (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), I expect a similar learning process to develop with at
least some of the viewers.
3.4 Knowledge of Immigration Policy
In a laboratory experiment I test a salient policy debate to see whether extreme me-
dia can teach even when discussing policy issues. The topic discussed in the video clips
shown in the experiment is the Arizona immigration law (Senate Bill or S.B. 1070) because
immigration is a salient topic, but one that can likely discern between politically attentive
and inattentive subjects. Furthermore, though aspects of this law were widely reported the
elapsed time between the airing of the shows used here and implementation of the experiment
is over one year.
Policy-specific knowledge is generally not well retained by the general public (Delli Carpini
& Keeter, 1996; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Immigration also presents a good test for
theories on information acquisition through extreme media because the hosts will allow their
partisan predispositions to frame their coverage. A liberal host will frame the debate about
the Arizona immigration law so that ideologically opposed subjects might be turned off and
not learn any policy-specific information. Similarly, liberal subjects who watch conserva-
tive extreme media might be turned off of that host’s frame as well. Therefore, there is
a real chance that no knowledge acquisition occurs because subjects may not believe the
information coming from an ideologically opposing figure (i.e., Taber & Lodge, 2006).
Opinions about immigration are often built off of economic positions and fears about
globalization (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997).
Additionally, proximity to large immigrant populations affects the ways Americans feel about
immigrants (Tolbert & Hero, 2001), as does education (Hood & Morris, 1998) and ideology
and partisanship (Citrin et al., 1997; Hood & Morris, 1997, 1998). News media frames
on immigration also demonstrate significant effects on opinions about immigration (Domke,
McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010). Domke et al. (1999), for
instance, framed news stories as “material” or “ethical” and produce differences in attitudes.
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Most studies about immigration focus on opinion change, so a notable omission in immi-
gration research is investigating the ways media can increase political knowledge about this
dense policy area. Sides and Citrin (2007) use an experiment to test the effect of new infor-
mation about the size of the immigrant population in the United States on attitudes, but the
primary finding is that citizens are simply unknowledgeable about immigration generally.
Immigration is a hard case to test information acquisition because that the ideological
direction of extreme media personalities is known to their viewers and listeners (Morris, 2005;
Stroud, 2008, 2010). There may be priming effects generating misperceptions associated
with the presentation of content by these hosts. Research on misperceptions shows that even
when confronted with information in an attempt to correct their misperception people will
begin to anchor in their strongly held-but wrong-beliefs (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Redlawsk
et al., 2010). This study does not assess corrections per se, but will be able to test if
extreme media exacerbate or prime misperceptions, which is a complaint leveled against
them (Barker, 2002; Jamieson & Cappella, 2010; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), but is as of
yet untested.
3.5 Theory and Hypothesis
Research shows that media have the capacity to teach in some cases (Baum, 2003a;
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Graber, 1988, 2001; Jerit et al., 2006). Extreme media
should also be able to increase political knowledge among those who consume these media.
This theory builds off of Baum (2003a, 2003b) because one method for producing knowledge
is to simply introduce citizens to information they might not otherwise encounter. This also
comports with Luskin’s (1990) seminal motive, opportunity, ability framework where con-
sumers of extreme media meet all of these criteria for increase sophistication and knowledge.
Additionally, extreme media also have the added effect of increasing viewer affective intelli-
gence by emotional appeals and hyperbolic language (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993; Sobieraj
& Berry, 2011). Thus, there are two pathways to knowledge via extreme media.
The first pathway to knowledge is the direct effect. This effect is, as previously stated,
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garnered by media informing viewers on topics they might not encounter elsewhere. Thus,
even in non-extreme versions of the same extreme opinionated news hosts learning should be
present. However, given the added affective intelligence component it might be the case that
information in an extreme environment might produce higher levels of political knowledge.
This is the indirect effect. My formal hypothesis is as follows:
• Hypothesis 1: Viewers watching media will have higher levels of political knowledge
than the control group.
These hypothesis are predicated on the preceding literature, but also highlight a gap in the
literature. The effect of extreme media is still an open question. Though research is being
done, as of yet there are no published studies expressly targeting the educational effect of
extreme media as a group. This project fills that gap.
3.6 Data
Subjects were drawn in a convenience sample from a large research university in the
southeastern United States. Subjects were randomized into one of three treatment conditions
or a control condition where they were instructed to watch a video that appeared in an
online environment. Subjects were college students in a mandatory class and were offered
extra credit for their participation. The videos were hosted on YouTube so that they would
approximate likely online viewing experiences. The control group watched a video of a bird
which has been demonstrated in numerous experiments to not effect results in social science
experiments. The treatment groups watched videos showing a clip of Glenn Beck as seen
on FOX News or Countdown with Keith Olbermann from MSNBC, or a clip from the PBS
NewHour program. Glenn Beck and Keith Olbermann were selected for the following reasons:
1) Beck and Olbermann are noted by Sobieraj and Berry (2011) as the most extreme hosts
in their study period, and 2) both Beck and Olbermann have sufficient content on Arizona’s
immigration law. The PBS clip serves as the traditional media content control (Dilliplane,
2011). See Appendix A and Appendix C for a full transcript and table of specific topics
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mentioned in each video.
Table 3.1 displays the pertinent demographic summary statistics for the subjects in the
extreme media experiments. The subjects skew toward traditional college age, are somewhat
liberal, are more likely to be women, and half the sample is non-white (Black/African-
American is the most common ethnicity among minority subjects). Based on t-tests, there
are no significant differences between the treatment conditions. Randomization successfully
balanced the subjects and unit homogeneity was achieved.
Table 3.1 Experimental Subjects’ Demographic Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
White 0.273 0.446 686
Black 0.423 0.494 686
Latino 0.15 0.357 686
Male 0.352 0.478 650
Age 20.393 4.948 631
Pre-Test Knowledge 3.397 1.017 638
Ideology 4.616 1.548 649
Each video treatment was roughly four minutes long, and began with the typical in-
troduction used by the shows as they appear on television. Each video discusses the same
information and uses both the host and several “cut-away” clips of other individuals.2 Un-
like other experiments (i.e., Mutz, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005), the treatment in this
experiment is not an edited version of a show or a certain phrase. These clips were the
actual aired segments of the show itself. I use actual clips because the effect of extreme
media is produced by a combination of the introduction, guests, and the manner in which
the hosts discuss the information and so on. For this reason the treatments are the clips
themselves. This may limit the types of causal claims I can make based on these shows. For
instance, I cannot isolate the particular words or phrases that contribute or inhibit increases
in knowledge or misperceptions. This is a limitation, but it is one that is required if we want
to study real-life content, which always contains multiple images and phrases.
2Please see Web Appendix C for a full transcript.
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The questions used to construct the dependent variable—political knowledge—are con-
structed to be surveillance knowledge questions (Jerit et al., 2006). These types of questions
are useful because they gauge if the subjects get information out of the treatment. The infor-
mation to answer these questions was contained in the clips, but was also available knowledge
to those who may be politically engaged. To ascertain the treatment effects of knowledge
contained within the shows I ask specific questions about the topic covered in all of these
clips: Arizona’s S.B. 1070. The surveillance knowledge questions are: 1) “Which state
passed a bill to address illegal immigration?,” 2) “Who is the Governor of the state passing
the immigration bill?,” 3) “What is the name or number of the bill that addresses illegal
immigration in Arizona?,” 4) “Does the immigration law in Arizona require anyone who is
asked to present their identification for immigration purposes?,” and 5) “Which political
party is responsible for passing the law in Arizona concerning immigration?”
The first two questions were open-ended where the subjects typed their answers. An-
swers accepted as correct and coded as one—zero for all others—for the first question was,
“Arizona.” For the second question the correct answer was, “Jan Brewer” or “Brewer.” For
the third question I accepted “SB 1070” or “1070.” The last two questions the subjects
answered via radial buttons on the computer screen. The fourth question was coded correct
if answered as, “yes,” and the fifth was coded correct if the subjects selected “Republican”
from their answer choices. The information to answer these questions was contained in each
clip used as a treatment.
3.7 Television Media
3.7.1 Experimental Results
The main dependent variable in lab experiment is political knowledge. It is measured
as a surveillance knowledge variable and is measured with the five questions on Arizona’s
immigration law previously described.3 To gain a measure of political knowledge I conduct
3The mean for Political Knowledge as a raw scale is 2.96 with a 1.23 standard deviation.
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a principle-component analysis using the five questions. The results (available in Web Ap-
pendix E for PCA table) demonstrate that the questions strongly load as one component
with an eigenvalue well above 1, so I use that component measure as the dependent vari-
able. Figure 3.1 displays the treatment effects of the media content on the PCA political
knowledge measure with 95% confidence intervals using two-tailed tests.
Figure 3.1 Treatment Effects for Media on S.B. 1070 Knowledge
As demonstrated by Figure 3.1, it is clear that the PBS treatment is positive and
significant compared to the control group. This finding is both intuitive, and expected.
The important finding in this figure is that both of the extreme media treatments—Beck
and Olbermann—are positive and significant compared to the control. These findings are
important for two reasons. First, the dominant supposition in the literature at this time
is that extreme media are not informative. These results show that this is not the case.
Extreme media are at least as informative as traditional news like PBS. Secondly, these
results demonstrate that extreme media can produce a positive externality in the form of
political knowledge on a technical area of policy.
3.7.2 Interactions
There are two important interactions to assess when considering the effect of extreme
media. The first of these is the effect of the ideological orientation of the viewers. As the
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motivated reasoning literature demonstrates, individuals will use their prior attitudes to
color the new information they acquire (i.e., see Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Liberals should
learn more from Olbermann and PBS, but less if they are in the Beck treatment. Similarly,
conservatives should learn more from Beck or PBS when compared to Olbermann. Beck and
Olbermann should have the largest effects amongst their ideologically consistent viewers.
Moderates should learn more from Beck and Olbermann than PBS because of the entertain-
ment associated with these hosts (Baum, 2003a). To assess this possibility, I breakdown the
subjects into their self-identified ideological groups—conservatives, moderates, and liberals—
and plot the treatment effects on knowledge of Arizona’s immigration law. The patterns in
treatment effects comport with the basic expectations, but the confidence intervals over-
lap. The result is that though there is some evidence that the expected interactions may
have some effect, the effects are not strong enough to reach acceptable levels of statistical
significance. Figure 3.2 displays the treatment effects by the differences in ideology.
Figure 3.2 Treatment Effects for Media on S.B. 1070 Knowledge, by Ideology
The second interaction is the mediating effect of subjects’ political knowledge, and
can be found in Figure 3.3. It is possible subjects with higher levels of general political
knowledge4 are affected differently in each of the treatments. If there are significant results
4By “general political knowledge” I mean the traditional Delli Carpini and Keeter-type (1996) civic-based
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here, then prior political knowledge would have to be accounted for in explaining the effect
of extreme media to educate on more technical policy areas. I divide the sample into three
categories based on their pre-test political knowledge score—high pre-test knowledge, mean
pre-test knowledge, and low pre-test knowledge. The mean of the sample was 3.3 based on
the 5 question scale with a standard deviation of 1.016. Every subject who scored at least
one standard deviation above the mean I coded as “high” pre-test knowledge, while all those
falling at least one standard deviation below the mean are coded as “low” political knowledge.
As with the previous interaction effect with ideology, these results also show inconclusive
findings. For the high pre-test knowledge subjects, subjects in each of the treatment groups
score significantly higher than the control. However, none of the extreme treatments, once
again, are significantly different than the PBS treatment. This shows again that Beck and
Olbermann are at least as informative as PBS on immigration, which is contrary to the
expectations in the literature to this point. With the low and mean pre-test knowledge
subjects, the confidence intervals are too large to make any substantive claims. In the low
pre-test knowledge graph, the mean for Beck and Olbermann is higher than either PBS or
the control suggesting that the entertainment or bombast associated with these shows may
help subjects be engaged with the material. Without statistical significance there is little
substantive to say outside of the general direction.
3.7.3 Cross-Sectional Data
To assess how well the casual effects uncovered in the experiment comport with actual
reports of media use and factual political knowledge, I use cross-sectional data from the
Annenberg National Elections Study from 2008.5 This dataset is superior to the National
factual knowledge. I measure pre-test general political knowledge with the following questions: 1) For how
many years is a United States Senator elected-that is, how many year are there in one full term of office
for a U.S. Senator?, 2) For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives
elected-that is, how many years are there in one full terms of office for a U.S. House member?, 3) Who is the
current prime minister of the United Kingdom?, 4) In which chamber of Congress do Republicans have a
majority?, and 5) Do you happen to know many times an individual can be elected President of the United
States under current laws?
5The dataset can be accessed at this website: http : //www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org.
42
Figure 3.3 Treatment Effects for Media on S.B. 1070 Knowledge, by Pre-Test Knowledge
Election Study (NES) because the NES only asks questions about the frequency of media
consumption and type. NES question do not probe the hosts or substance of the shows as
the NAES does. The result is a level of specification with media independent variables that
has yet to be seen in survey data.
Table 3.2 displays the summary statistics for the NAES data. The observations are
quite large with this dataset because of the rolling sample the NAES uses. The dependent
variable is Political Knowledge, and is coded zero to four. These questions are the NAES
version of the traditional Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) knowledge index common in the
NES. So, while this type of knowledge differs from the surveillance knowledge used in the
experiment, this knowledge scale is routinely used in political science and provides a validity
check on knowledge as a general concept.6
The independent variable of interest is Extreme Host. Extreme Host is coded one if
the host has a distinct ideological direction and uses ad hominem or bombastic attacks on
their opponents, and is coded zero if they do not. For instance, Glenn Beck and Keith
6The questions used by the NAES—following Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996)—are 1) Who has the final
responsibility to determine is a law is Constitutional?, 2) How much of a majority is required for the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives to override a presidential veto?, 3) Do you happen to know which
party has the most members in the House of Representatives?, and 4) To the best of your knowledge, do you
happen to know how Supreme Court justices are chosen? Are they nominated by a nonpartisan congressional
committee, elected by the American people, nominated by the president and then confirmed by the Senate,
or appointed if they receive a two-thirds majority vote of the justices already on the court?
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Table 3.2 NAES Summary Data
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Knowledge 29791 2.531 1.263 0 4
Extreme Host 41944 0.02 0.142 0 1
Ext. Lib. Host 41944 0.013 0.112 0 1
Ext. Con. Host 41944 0.008 0.089 0 1
NE Con. Host 41944 0.204 0.403 0 1
NE Lib. Host 41944 0.085 0.279 0 1
Democrat 55473 0.365 0.481 0 1
Republican 55473 0.297 0.457 0 1
Ideological 55915 1.34 0.94 0 2
Education 56610 5.563 2.311 1 9
Male 57967 0.427 0.494 0 1
Age 56686 53.258 16.001 18 97
Income 50161 5.779 2.155 1 9
White 56191 0.855 0.351 0 1
Black 56191 0.08 0.272 0 1
Latino 56191 0.155 0.123 0 1
Interest in Politics 57614 2.231 0.81 0 3
Television Freq. 57160 5.474 2.465 0 7
Newspaper Freq. 57625 2.916 3.02 0 7
Internet Freq. 44663 2.931 3.03 0 7
Listen to Radio 57625 0.387 0.487 0 1
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Olbermann are coded as extreme, but Wolf Blitzer is not. This coding follows from the
previous section and other literature (i.e., Dilliplane, 2011; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). To
account for the argument that effects may be driven by one side of the ideological divide, I
also break Extreme Host into Liberal Extreme Host and Conservative Extreme Host.7 I am
also able to include two important control independent variables: Non-Extreme Liberal TV
and Non-Extreme Conservative TV. Dilliplane (2011) demonstrates that distinctly partisan
media produces differential effects on political behavior. Congruence in media choice and
ideology produces political activity, while incongruence does not. Including controls for the
partisanship or ideological direction of media also helps justify my claim that it is not just
that people are paying more attention because of the self-selection effects for partisan media
(Stroud, 2008), but extremeness of the host is significant as well. The Non-Extreme Liberal
TV and Non-Extreme Conservative TV variables are based on coding by Dilliplane (2011),
and coded here as one if the host is partisan and not extreme. All non-partisan, non-extreme
television media are coded zero. Where Dilliplane references the partisan bias in the news,
I label this variable with the partisan ideological direction for ease of interpretation because
there is ample evidence that ideological polarization and homogeneity now make partisanship
and ideology synonymous in many cases (Abramowitz, 2010).
The control variables are known predictors of civics-based political knowledge. Those
who are more ideological may have higher levels of political knowledge because they will be
more engaged, so Ideological is coded zero to two as a folded scale from Annenberg ideologi-
cal question (0 = moderate, 1 = somewhat ideological, 2 = very ideological). Partisanship is
known to predict political knowledge because partisans will be more engaged, so Republican
and Democrat are both dichotomously controlled (1 = identity with the party, 0 = inde-
pendent). Education will clearly predict political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996;
Jerit et al., 2006), as should being male. Education ranges from one to nine and is as based
off of the Annenberg question (1 = 8th grade or lower, 2 = some high school, no diploma, 3
7Glenn Beck, Bill O’Reilly, Sean Hannity, and Lou Dobbs are considered “extreme” conservatives, while
Chris Matthews and Keith Olbermann are the “extreme” liberals. These coding decisions follow Dilliplane
(2011).
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= high school diploma, 4 = technical or vocational school, 5 = some college, 6 = Associate’s
or two-year college, 7 = four-year degree, 8 = graduate school, no degree, 9 = graduate or
professional degree). Male is dichotomous. Age and Income are also used as control with
age being continuous and income being categorical at one through nine. Political Interest
will significantly predict political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jerit et al.,
2006), so it is controlled with a variable ranging from zero to three where zero is “not inter-
ested” and three is “very interested” in politics. Racial controls are White, Black, and Latino
with being White expected to positively predict political knowledge and Black and Latino
expected to negatively related to political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).
Each of these variables is dichotomous. Finally, media consumption variables are Television,
Newspaper, and Internet which are all coded zero to seven representing the number of days
in the week a respondent uses these media get to information. Finally, I code for listening
to political talk radio with a dichotomous variable.
Because the dependent variable, General Political Knowledge, is coded zero to four,
ordered probit model specifications are necessary (Borooah, 2002). Additionally, as these
data are obtained via a rolling cross-section sample over a year, I use robust standard errors
clustered on the date of the survey (174 days in total). This will account for any variation
over the term of the survey that may affect the results. Table 3.3 displays the first two
model specifications testing the hypothesis that extreme television media are correlated
with increased levels of political knowledge. The first model is a bivariate model testing
the effect of the extreme host variable on knowledge without any controls. In Model 1 this
variable is clearly significant, and it suggests that there is a correlation between extreme
media consumption and civic-based political knowledge. Adding in controls in Model 2
the correlation from Model 1 is still present. Extreme Host is still positive and significant
indicating that those who watch extreme hosts have higher political knowledge than those
who do not. For the full results, I turn to Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.4.
In Model 3 the independent variable, Extreme Host, is positive and significant. This
demonstrates that there is a significant correlation with watching extreme news media on tele-
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Table 3.3 Ordered Probit Model for Political Knowledge (2008 NAES)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Extreme Host 0.478*** 0.056 0.240** 0.071
Democrat —– —– -0.074* 0.023
Republican —– —– -0.0008 0.023
Ideology —– —– 0.019* 0.009
Education —– —– 0.209*** 0.006
Male —– —– 0.469*** 0.020
Age —– —– 0.011*** 0.0007
Income —– —– 0.065*** 0.005
White —– —– 0.244*** 0.039
Black —– —– -0.231** 0.048
Latino —– —– -0.259** 0.091
Interest —– —– 0.197*** 0.014
TV —– —– 0.006 0.006
Newspaper —– —– 0.009** 0.009
Internet —– —– 0.023*** 0.003
Radio —– —– 0.031 0.018
Cutpoint 1 -1.478 0.012 0.520 0.069
Cutpoint 2 -0.860 0.010 1.274 0.071
Cutpoint 3 -0.255 0.009 2.020 0.073
Cutpoint 4 0.579 0.010 3.024 0.074
N = 21455 N = 14608
Wald χ2 = 71.37 Wald χ2 = 4052.55
Pseudo R2 = 0.0013 Pseudo R2 = 0.094
Note: † p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Two-tailed tests; all models clustered on sampling date
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vision and increased levels of civics based political knowledge. These findings are made more
convincing by the controls for ideologically oriented—but not extreme—television. Both
Non-extreme Conservative TV and Non-Extreme Liberal TV are positive and significant as
well. The omitted category is all respondents who watch news which is non-ideological and
non-extreme. One might expect watching Special Report with Brit Hume or The Situation
Room with Wolf Blitzer to be correlated with informed viewers on civics-based political
knowledge—which is the implication of these variables. However, even while controlling for
these types of shows, extreme media—such as Countdown with Keith Olbermann and The
O’Reilly Factor—still correlate with increased political knowledge. That extreme media con-
sumption is correlated with higher levels of political knowledge when compared to individuals
in the omitted category is a counter intuitive finding based on the previous literature.
One might consider that the variable for extreme host alone is not appropriate as there
may be differences between liberal and conservative hosts. This possibility is accounted
for in Model 4. Again, as with Model 3, the variables of interest are significant in the
expected direction. This is strong evidence that the causal relationship exhibited by the
experimental results are not laboratory effects and suggest external validity is not a threat
to the experiment.
Turning to the controls for partisanship, being a Democrat is associated with lower po-
litical knowledge at the, while being a Republican is negative, but insignificant. Respondents
who are more ideological are correlated with increased levels of knowledge in Model 2, but
not Model 3 with the full specification. These results suggest that ideology and partisanship
play little role in gaining political knowledge in this 2008 NAES sample. For the socio-
economic controls, education, male, income, and being white all positively and significantly
predict having higher levels of political knowledge. These findings mirror other research on
political knowledge (i.e., Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jerit et al., 2006) and make the
findings for Extreme Host more robust. Being black or Latino is associated with statistically
significant lower levels of political knowledge. Finally, on the interest in politics and media
consumption variables, the results comport with previous research as well. Interest in poli-
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Table 3.4 Ordered Probit Model for Political Knowledge (2008 NAES), Full Specifications
Model 3 Model 4
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Extreme Host 0.264*** 0.072 —– —–
Ext. Lib. Host —– —– 0.357* 0.105
Ext. Con. Host —– —– 0.198*** 0.093
NE Lib. Host 0.115*** 0.023 0.166*** 0.031
NE Con. Host 0.165*** 0.031 0.116*** 0.023
Democrat -0.065** 0.023 -0.067** 0.023
Republican -0.016 0.024 -0.015 0.024
Ideology 0.015*** 0.009 0.015 0.009
Education 0.211*** 0.006 0.211*** 0.006
Male 0.467*** 0.020 0.467*** 0.020
Age 0.011*** 0.0007 0.011*** 0.0007
Income 0.064*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.005
White 0.241*** 0.039 0.240*** 0.039
Black -0.229 0.049 -0.230*** 0.049
Latino -0.256** 0.092 -0.257** 0.093
Interest 0.183*** 0.014 0.183*** 0.014
TV 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
Newspaper 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002
Internet 0.023*** 0.003 0.023*** 0.003
Radio 0.026 0.018 0.027 0.018
Cutpoint 1 0.490 0.069 0.488 0.069
Cutpoint 2 1.246 0.071 1.244 0.071
Cutpoint 3 1.995 0.073 1.993 0.073
Cutpoint 4 3.000 0.074 2.999 0.074
N = 14608 N = 14608
Wald χ2 = 4133.91 Wald χ2 = 4132.47
Pseudo R2 = 0.095 Pseudo R2 = 0.095
Note: † p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Two-tailed tests; all models clustered on sampling date
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tics is positive and significant meaning that those who care about politics know more about
it, while more frequent newspaper readers and those who access the internet often to obtain
information are also correlated with increased levels of political knowledge.
The results reported in this section give external validity to the experimental results in
the previous section. Taken together, these analyses demonstrate that, rather than being
problematic for democracy, extreme media can serve a public function: they inform their
viewers. This important point has so far been debated without being tested. These tests
reveal the concerns espoused by some may be misplaced in terms of the dissemination of
political knowledge.
3.8 Radio
The medium that is most often associated with extremeness or outrageousness is po-
litical talk radio (PTR). The prior PTR literature is almost uniformly focused on attitude
change (see Barker, 2002; Barker & Knight, 2000; S. E. Bennett, 2002a, 2002b, 2009;
Hofstetter, Donovan, Klauber, & Cole, 1994; Jamieson & Cappella, 2010, for examples
and review). Political talk radio has traditionally been assumed to be not helpful-if not
actually harmful-for American politics (Hofstetter et al., 1994). These assumptions have
changed over time, and talk radio listeners have been shown to be very difficult to mobi-
lize en masse (Hofstetter & Gianos, 1997). Because most research to date has focused on
whether PTR changes attitudes or if PTR can make citizens more or less active in politics,
the main dependent variable in these studies is not political knowledge.
For example, Barker (2002) finds that-in the case of Rush Limbaugh PTR listeners are
persuaded to view conservative policies more favorably than liberal policies, while accounting
for previous attitudes. Additionally, Barker and Knight (2000) show that on issues where
Limbaugh is negative and discusses with regularity, his listeners attitudes show statistically
significant change in his attitudinal direction. However, on issues where his portrayal is
positive or intermittent, there is no statistically significant effect from Limbaugh listening.
This implies that Limbaugh has some effect on his listeners, but that effect is conditional.
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Jones (1998) uses the 1996 Republican primary in New Hampshire to test Limbaugh effect
on citizen’s attitudes toward public officials. Using NES data from that primary, Jones
tests the pre-anti-Buchannan and post-anti-Buchannan attitudes of Granite State voters
(Limbaugh apparently greatly disliked Patrick Buchannan, and repeatedly said so in response
to Buchannan’s increase in the polls nearing the primary). Jones clearly demonstrates the
conservative skew of the Limbaugh audience, but his models do not detect a significant
decrease in the opinions for Buchannan by primary voters. Lee and Cappella (2001), contrary
to Jones, suggest that political talk radio is a key factor in opinion evaluation of public figures.
Thus, while these studies are informative about how exposure to PTR affects opinion
change and behavior, it does not answer the questions about political learning. Jamieson
and Cappella (2010) show that political talk radio “Balkanizes” listeners. They say little,
however, about the effects of knowledge on these PTR listeners at-large, although they find
that Rush Limbaugh listeners are woefully unknowledgeable about the 1996 Clinton cam-
paign (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010, p. 197–198). In contrast, my central research question
is: Are PTR listeners more knowledgeable, generally, than non-listeners while controlling for
known determinants of political knowledge? The answer to this question has implications for
the quality of democracy in the United States, and the usefulness of talk radio as a medium
for disseminating political information.
The contribution of this research is to test whether PTR produces a positive externality
in the form of increased political knowledge. My hypothesis is that political knowledge is
higher among PTR listeners when compared to non-listeners. In the next sections I describe
the data I use to test this hypothesis and the methods used to mitigate issues of endogeneity
and causality common with research on media effects.
3.8.1 Assessing Knowledge and Political Talk Radio
To test my hypothesis, I use data from NES surveys in 1996, 2000, and 2000, and
the NAES in 2008. These years are selected from the NES because these are the only
NES surveys where a question about PTR was explicitly asked during presidential elections.
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These years are important because these encompass the years when PTR was reaching its
early peaks in listenership. Furthermore, the 2000 and 2004 Presidential election campaigns
were closely contested which helps make this a hard case to prove my theory. It is plausible
that in these highly contested campaigns people might simply seek out information. Thus,
it will be harder for me to find significant results than in years where the races were not
highly contested. Because the 2008 NES does not ask about PTR, I turn to the National
Annenberg Election Study (NAES).
There are additional benefits to the NAES because it is specifically designed to research
various types of media and their effect on electoral politics. As a result, the NAES asks much
more specific questions about radio listenership than the NES. Furthermore, the NAES is
a rolling cross-sectional survey every month from December of 2007 to Election Day. This
yields a total of 57,967 possible respondents, which is considerably more than the NES.8
Given the difference in question wording for the two surveys, it is impossible to combine
them into the same dataset. However, they can work well as robustness checks for each
other, and can test my theory over four election years with four distinct survey sample
populations.
It is important to use data that can predict PTR consumption to estimate the propensity
score for the matching model discussed below. S. E. Bennett (2002a) and Hollander (1997)
suggest a number of variables to include for a propensity model. Also important is that
these variables also affect levels of political knowledge. Using previous knowledge literature
as a guide (Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), it is clear that
the variables chosen for these matching models should satisfy both of these concerns.
The dependent variable is a knowledge scale in both surveys. These follow from the
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) knowledge index. The NES survey uses a 6 point knowledge
scale while the NAES uses 4. It should be noted that the mean for each of these is at the
8Due to the differences in the time periods when the questions were asked, I am forced to drop a con-
siderable amount of observations. However, for the NAES concerns about these missing observations are
mitigated because of the sampling method employed. Each of their monthly polls were validated, so I can
be reasonably sure that though I am forced to use mostly the respondents from the end of the polling period
that these data reflect a random sample.
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middle of the category (2.9 for the NES and 2.5 for the NAES). The independent variable
of interest for the models presented here is dichotomous. For the NES models, it is a
simple question asking if respondents listen to political talk radio. However, they do not
probe respondents for specific show information or hosts. The NAES, conversely, does probe
respondents to specify their talk radio listening habits. Both measures clearly capture what
would be thought of as typical PTR (Limbaugh, Hannity, etc.), but the NES data may
include things such as National Public Radio or a local radio station that only does news
updates, but the respondent considers that PTR. There is no way to know which type of
talk radio they listen to in the NES, so any results from those data must be assessed with
that caveat. For the NAES, I use the name of the radio host the respondent listens to most
often to code for PTR or not. 22,243 respondents claim they listen to radio on a regular
basis in the NAES and only 5,249 listen to hosts that can be definitively coded as PTR.
The control variables used in this project are theoretically relevant predictors of higher
political knowledge and listening to PTR.9 From the NES, I use demographic characteristics
such as Income, Age, Male, White, and Education for control variables. Previous research
demonstrates that these demographic variables play a key role in predicting listening to
PTR. I also include media consumption variables such as Local TV Watching, National
TV Watching, and Newspaper Readership. Finally, I control for political attitudes with the
variables Ideological, which is a folded ideology index in the NES, and Attention to Politics.
Those who are more ideological are likely to have more political knowledge and likely to
listen to PTR, and the same is true for those who pay more attention to politics. The top
of Table 3.5 lists the NES variables and their summary statistics. The bottom of the table
lists the summary statistics for the NAES.
The variables taken from the NAES are similar, but with different question word and
coding in some circumstances. This is a result of the differences in the original coding from
the Annenberg Public Policy Center. Where the coding could be made the same as the NES,
9S. E. Bennett (2002a) predicts PTR listenership, thus I take the most important variables from his
models. Importantly, these variables also predict political knowledge.
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Table 3.5 Matching Routine Summary Table for NES and NAES Surveys
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Knowledge 4142 2.922 1.822 0 6
Radio 4154 0.387 0.487 0 1
Income 4329 9.061 6.37 1 24
Education 4722 4.226 1.63 1 7
Age 4721 47.332 17.156 18 96
Male 4733 0.448 0.497 0 1
While 4723 0.788 0.408 0 1
Ideological 3487 1.142 0.931 0 3
Natl TV 4725 3.454 2.771 0 7
Local TV 4729 3.571 2.776 0 7
Newspaper 4733 3.327 2.898 0 7
Pol. Attn. 4733 1.107 0.714 0 2
Knowledge 7493 2.551 1.237 0 4
Radio 7493 0.434 0.495 0 1
Income 6547 5.871 2.155 1 9
Education 7293 1.781 1.581 0 4
Age 7321 53.258 15.545 18 97
Male 7493 0.423 0.494 0 1
White 7219 0.855 0.35 0 1
Ideological 7263 1.344 0.938 0 3
TV 7395 6.015 2.098 0 7
Newspaper 7460 3.112 3.072 0 7
Pol. Attn. 7449 2.45 0.721 0 3
Note: 1996, 2000, and 2004 NES data pooled on top;
2008 NAES summary data on bottom.
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it has been done. For this database, I control—once again—for the following demographic
characteristics: Income, Age, Male, White, and Education. The media consumption variables
used as controls in this dataset do delineate between local television and national television.
Thus they are only TV News and Newspaper Readership. The media variables are coded
to reflect the number of days a week each respondent uses one of these media to get news
or information about political issues, specifically the 2008 campaign. Attention to Politics
ranges from 0 to 3 meaning “no interest” to “very interested,” and though this is one less
category than the NES it is unlikely to make a difference. Ideological is, as with the NES,
a folded ideology scale. The reason for the differences between Ideological in both surveys
(NES is zero to four, while NAES is zero to three) is because the NAES does not ask if
respondents are “somewhat” conservative or liberal. Thus, there is one less category for
the NAES ideology score. See the Appendix A for the variables’ full names and question
wording.
3.8.2 Matching
As in most research on political knowledge and media effects, omitted variable bias and
endogeneity are concerns that must be addressed (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). For
instance, a very real concern for this project is the self-selection mechanism at work when
people choose their media environments (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy, n.d.). It could
be the case that people with higher levels of political knowledge are more likely to select
into PTR, prima fascia. Without a systematic way to assign respondents into treatment
and control groups no causal claims can be made. The only way around these issues is to
conduct an experiment where we can be certain that the only difference between the treated
(PTR) and the control (non-PTR) groups is our assigned treatment. I use propensity score
matching to create very similarly matched pairs of listeners and non-listeners to estimate
the effect of PTR on political knowledge. I also find similar results using ordered logistic
regression modeling.
Though matching is becoming common in political science, some explanations of my
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reasons for using it are warranted. Importantly, concerns about endogeneity and omitted
variable bias can be minimized with propensity score matching (Becker & Ichino, 2002;
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). At the very basic level, matching is a method where two ob-
servations that are the same on all characteristics except for one-the treatment-are compared
or “matched” to assess the effect of the treatment on a dependent or outcome variable. The
most common type of matching for observational data is propensity score matching (Becker
& Ichino, 2002; Rosenbaum, 2002). The propensity score is obtained by estimating a
logit or probit model assessing the likelihood of each observed control variable predicting
the treatment variable. In this case, I use Radio as the treatment, so the propensity score
estimates the likelihood that a respondent would listen to PTR. The second step in valid
matching using propensity scores is ensuring that the data are balanced within their propen-
sity score blocks (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Ho, Kosuke, King, & Stuart, 2011). Balance is
achieved when there is no statistical difference between the treatment and control groups
on any observed variables within each block. This process allows for valid causal inferences
because the only statistical difference between the treated and control groups will be the
effect of the treatment on the outcome. I generate my propensity score and balance using
the pscore command in Stata (Becker & Ichino, 2002). The pscore command estimates a
probit model for the likelihood of receiving the treatment (radio), blocks on propensity score
values, and balances within each of those blocks. The final balanced blocks for each of the
matching models are in available in Appendix B.
Thus, researchers must take care to have a theoretically valid propensity score model,
but it cannot contain covariates that make the estimation incapable of balance. Once the
data are balanced and a propensity score is generated, researchers have a value assessing the
propensity for each observation to have the treatment. Using the observed control variables
used to obtain the propensity score, and the theoretically relevant matching technique10 a
final matching procedure produces an average treatment affect (A.T.T.), standard deviations,
10These methods are nearest neighbor, kernel, stratified, or exact matching. I use kernel matching
with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors because it requires more stringent assumptions about
the matches, and thus is less likely to generate a Type I error.
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and t-tests of the difference between the matched observations (Becker & Ichino, 2002).
Importantly, there are specific criteria researchers should consider when using match-
ing. As outlined by Arceneaux and Johnson (2010), “1) treatment and comparison groups
measure outcomes in identical ways, 2) treatment and control observations are sampled from
similar locations or contexts, and 3) the data contain a rich set of variables that affect both
the outcome and the probability of being treated.”11 The data in this project meet each of
these criteria as they are a random sample of the population within the stated years, the out-
come is radio listenership, and the propensity score models are based on previous research.
Another limitation of this method is that there could be omitted variable bias in the con-
struction of the propensity score. Rosenbaum (2002) presents a way to calculate the omitted
variable bias in matching models. Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis is important because it
provides a method for expelling possible omitted variable bias from the model, and solidify-
ing the matching results. I go into more detail about this procedure and its results below.
By controlling for the variables in the model, plus calculating out omitted variable bias, the
causal path is clearer on the impact of my treatment (radio) on the outcome (knowledge).
3.8.3 Matching Results
The results for the NES are presented in Table 3.6. There are three sets of statistics
presented representing the three elections where the NES asks PTR questions (1996, 2000,
and 2004). These variables used to match are Income, Education, Age, Male, White, Ideolog-
ical, Nat’l TV, Local TV, Newspaper, and Attention to Politics. I use each questionnaire as
an independent model to assess these differences, if there are any, between elections. Given
the exact question wording of the NES, pooling is a possibility. There would be no way
to detect within year differences in the effect of PTR using a pooled model, thus, separate
models are presented.
The average treatment effect (A.T.T.) is the statistic of interest for assessing the capac-
11Arceneaux and Johnson (2010) cite Smith and Todd (2005) when outlining these criteria as they under-
take a similar study testing matching as a method.
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ity of the treatment to affect the outcome. As demonstrated in Table 3.6, PTR is positively
and significantly related to increases in political knowledge in two of the three NES mod-
els. In 1996 and 2000, PTR is associated with positive and significant increases in political
knowledge. In 2004, however, PTR as a treatment is positive but insignificant. The sub-
stantive effect of these average treatment effects can be thought of as almost a 1/6th of a
standard deviation increase in both 1996 and 2000 from PTR. While this effect is modest it
is nonetheless important because there is a history of null findings on this question. Addi-
tionally, matching mitigates concerns over endogeneity by ensuring that the only difference
between the treatment and control conditions is the fact that the treatment listens to PTR.
Essentially, a person who might otherwise be very politically knowledgeable is matched with
another respondent who is also very likely to be knowledgeable (based on observed variables),
but the difference is one respondent listens to PTR while the other does not. The respondent
who listens to PTR is, on average, more knowledgeable about these important civics-based
knowledge questions.
Table 3.6 Average Treatment Effect of Radio on Political Knowledge (NES)
Year N. Treated N. Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
1996 579 954 0.202 0.085 2.383
2000 561 994 0.234 0.087 2.684
2004 471 595 0.107 0.108 0.994
Note: NES data from 1996, 2000, and 2004. A.T.T. is average
treatment effect while using kernel matching on all other
variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
See top of Table 3.5 for variables.
Table 3.7 displays the results for the NAES 2008 data. The variables used to match in
this dataset are Income, Education, Age, Male, White, Ideological, TV, Newspaper, Internet,
and Attention to Politics. Table 3 demonstrates that in 2008, PTR, once again, is effective
at producing statistically significantly higher levels of political knowledge when compared to
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non-listeners. The effect in this sample is 0.076, and it is statistically significant. This effect
is smaller than the previous effects at roughly 1/8th of a standard deviation. Once again,
given the history of null findings on this question, and the degree to which we know the
predictors of political knowledge-specifically attention to politics-the ability of one medium
to significantly increase knowledge in this cacophonous media environment is an important
new result.
Table 3.7 Average Treatment Effect of Radio on Political Knowledge (NAES)
Year N-Treated N-Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
2008 4462 7446 0.128 0.024 5.375
Note: NAES data from 2008. A.T.T. is average treatment effect
while using kernel matching on all other variables with
bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
See bottom of Table 3.5 for variables.
As previously mentioned, one serious threat to the validity of these findings is the
possibility that there is omitted variable bias. This can be calculated, however, with the
remainder of the effect attributed directly to the treatment on the outcome (Rosenbaum,
2002). Rosenbaum states that because the propensity score is a probit or logit model we can
calculate the amount of variance in the treatment taken into account by the propensity score
model. Any variance unexplained is the result of random error or omitted variables. For the
purposes of validity testing, I will assume that any error left unexplained is omitted variable
bias, but this is a stringent assumption. It could be the case that 30% of the variance is
omitted variable bias while 70% is random error (or any other combination of percentages).
Because I cannot know the proportions with certainty, I will assume that it is all omitted
variable bias. Following Rosenbaum’s procedure (also see Richey (2007) for an example)
I calculate ROC curves for each of the four p-score models and subtract the percentage
of unexplained variance from each matching models average treatment effect. For each of
the years yielding significant results, subtracting the possible omitted variable bias out still
demonstrates that PTR was significant for increases in political knowledge in 1996, 2000,
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and 2008 for at least the p < .10 level.12
3.9 Conclusion
The debate about the ways media generate and disseminate political information is an
important one, and it is clear that there are normatively problematic issues with this type of
media as people being to self-select into an increasingly polarized media environment (Prior,
2007; Stroud, 2010). Incivility or outrage and partisan bias in media have documented
detrimental effects on various political attitudes and behaviors (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2010;
Dilliplane, 2011; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). However, we should never lose site of the fact
that extreme media also serve a purpose to inform, and based on evidence here they do
just that. Using both an experiment and cross-sectional data on cable television extreme
media hosts I show extreme media are correlated with positive and significant increases in
aggregate political knowledge. This finding holds for both civics-based political knowledge
and surveillance political knowledge. This is the first time this finding has been demonstrated
with this medium particularly. I extend these findings to political talk radio, as well, where
there is a history of null and negatively significant findings on this issue.
The extreme or outrage media literature is growing exponentially (Hansen and Kim
2011; Sobieraj and Berry 2011), and this study adds to it in an important way. Political
knowledge is a fundamental trait for successful democratic citizenship with media the main
conduit for knowledge in modern democracy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Graber, 2001).
As research in this area moves forward, coupling the effects of all extreme media—radio,
television, blogs, etc.—into a unified theory will be paramount. As with any study, however,
there are caveats.
Firstly, more experiments need to be done to assess the differences in treatment effects
found here. As stated earlier, this project is concerned with a holistic view of extreme
media. Thus, more precise, shorter treatments could be done to isolate certain phrases or
12The ROC curves range from .6358 to .6688. These model fits match S. E. Bennett (2002a) who uses
NES data to predict PTR audiences from the mid-1990s. Even the smallest significant effect, 2008, was
maintained after testing for sensitivity.
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segments of these extreme programs that will isolate the effects on knowledge acquisition or
misperceptions. I am unable anything substantive about the indirect vs. direct effect at this
time. More precise experimental treatments could elucidate these effects as well. Secondly,
these results are based on one student sample. Student samples are universally accepted
in experimental social science (Sears, 1986), but there is no replacement for replication in
the scientific method. Future research should focus on non-student populations. Lastly, this
project uses only one policy area-immigration. Replicating the results over more, perhaps
more obscure policy areas will also help justify internal validity claims.
Fundamentally, this project demonstrates one key finding: extreme media can teach.
Though this may seem obvious, it is not a claim without critics. Research of this nature is
important because should it be discovered that extreme media do harm to politics then it
will surely be the charge of politicians and policymakers to rectify the situation. However,
just because the method of information dissemination disagrees with our traditional, classic
understandings of rational political decision making does not mean that it is normatively
problematic. In fact, as demonstrated here, extreme media may actually be beneficial if it
produces important qualities such as political knowledge.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF EXTREME MEDIA ON POLITICAL
TRUST AND EFFICACY
4.1 Introduction
How do extreme political media affect key attitudinal characteristics like political trust
and efficacy? This is the question that animates this chapter. In the next pages I will outline
what political trust and efficacy are and how media can affect these attitudes. Political trust
is considered among one to the most important attitudes in a democratic society (Uslaner,
2002). This is the case regardless of whether one believes that trust or distrust is the
normatively better value. Additionally, efficacy is a key value if one wants to understand
how citizens understand the power dynamics between themselves and the government in a
society.
The point of this chapter in the light of this larger project is to demonstrate, once again,
that the implications of extreme media on both television and political talk radio are not
as straight forward as one might assume. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) note that political
talk radio as a medium produces cynicism that is difficult to overcome. As listeners engage
with the medium more and more they become jaded to the political system, and rather than
become motivated citizens they withdraw. If this is the case—and it may well be—then we
should see uniform decreases in political trust among extreme media consumers. Addition-
ally, external efficacy should also be decreased—even if internal efficacy is increased—because
what is the point of being active if politicians are going to ignore your demands? If extreme
media are producing these kinds of effects then there is certainly reason to be concerned
about their proliferation.
Conversely, it may be the case that these media produce a positive externality in the
form of political trust or efficacy. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, extreme media
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can produce political knowledge in both experimental setting and in cross-sectional survey
data. Highlighting yet another way in which these media enrich our political system is a
worthwhile endeavor, and is the goal of this chapter.
4.2 Political Trust
People are said to have political trust when they trust the actions and intentions of the
government or politicians. Though political trust has been the subject of research since the
1950s there is still debate about whether or not political trust is institutionally specific, or if it
is based on the evaluations of politicians in office at the time (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Research
demonstrates that both conceptions of political trust are valid under different circumstances
(Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington, 2005). Hetherington (1998), for instance, shows
that political trust has an endogenous effect with both institutions and political actors. The
upshot is that political trust is a complicated and vital research area.
Political trust is not to be confused with interpersonal trust (Putnam, 2001). While
they are similar and may be equally important, they are caused by different underlying
mechanisms (Uslaner, 2002). Interpersonal trust is specifically related to dealing with
other citizens, while political trust is directly related to the affect toward the institutions
or politicians in the government. Trust in government can be affected by scandals (Bowler
& Karp, 2004), for instance, but we would not expect that to affect citizens trust in each
other.
The normative value of political trust a matter of debate with some declaring that
political trust is good (Uslaner, 2002), while others claim that low levels of trust make
the conditions for political action well met (Gamson, 1968). The merits to distrust or
cynicism exist because if these attitudes are widespread they may spur political actors to
change their behavior (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974). Early studies of trust in government
attributed distrust to political parties not paying attention to centrists (Miller, 1974), but
newer research indicates that phenomenon is no longer the case—if it ever was (see Citrin
(1974) for a rebuttal to Miller (1974)). Political parties have become polarized causing
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centrists to become less trustful There are various conditions under which political trust can
be produced or inhibited. Some contend that political trust is a direct effect of evaluations
of the policy and political options available (i.e., Miller, 1974).
Political trust is important because it has direct implications for participation. Early
political science studies claim political trust is an important catalysts for participation be-
cause distrust meant cynicism and would thus inhibit political activity (Almond & Verba,
1963). Indeed, as political participation feel over the 20th Century, many began to assume
that this was the case. Yet, the notion that political distrust is anathema to political activity
has not been borne by decades of empirical research (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Gamson
(1968) posits that low levels of political trust—coupled with high levels of efficacy—is ex-
actly the prerequisite for political participation. In general, demonstrating that trust either
predicts increased or decreased levels of participation has been elusive. However, trust is a
significant predictor of support for policies in some circumstances.
Hetherington’s (2005) seminal work on political trust highlights the fact that as Amer-
ican’s have lost their trust in the Federal government, they are less willing to support a
wide range of government policies. Hetherington (2005, p. 3) states, “declining political
trust has played a central role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States
over the last several decades.” Trust may not have a play a causal role in participation in
the aggregate, but it is clearly a key mechanism for public opinion and support of policy
decisions. Furthermore, trust in government is a significant predictor of voting for third
party candidates (Hetherington, 1999). Trust as an important predictor in vote choice is
especially the case when candidates consistently use anti-government language and messages
(Citrin & Luks, 2001).
Like political trust, much ink has been spilled over political efficacy. Efficacy as a
concept has figured prominently in political science for nearly seventy years. There are
two distinct types of efficacy: internal and external (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Niemi,
Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Internal political efficacy, in short, is the feeling that one can
(or cannot) affect the political system (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Morrell, 2003).
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External efficacy, while closely related to internal efficacy, relates to “system responsiveness”
to citizen action (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985). Both of these attitudes are
important to consider when assessing how citizens interact with the political system. Unlike
the debate over the levels of trust in government, most scholars agree that increased levels
of efficacy-particularly internal efficacy-are necessary for vibrant participatory democracy.
Efficacy is linked to increased participation in a variety of activities. Most prominently
in the literature, we know that the higher the levels of efficacy one feels the more likely
they are to participate in election campaigns (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Rosenstone &
Hansen, 1993). This is a vitally important finding. The decline in electoral participation
is a perennial concern for political scientists, and decreasing levels of efficacy are partly to
blame (Teixeira, 1992). Efficacy has been shown to be an important predictor of registering
to vote (Timpone, 1998), rather than voting itself, which highlights the importance of
efficacy generally. Efficacy is linked to civic skills (Verba et al., 1995), and it has positive
implications for engaging in political discussion with others (Morrell, 2005).
4.3 Media Effects on Trust and Efficacy
Various types of media have shown the capacity to impact political trust and efficacy.
Although, scholars have yet to systematically look at extreme media over a long period of
time. The closest thing to extreme media research is research on “incivility” in political
television. Experiments show that uncivil exchanges significantly decrease trust (Mutz &
Reeves, 2005), and so, too, do shows that use close up shots of television hosts (Mutz, 2007).
Incivility, however, is not in question in this research project. There can be uncivil exchanges
on ABC Nightly News, but ABC Nightly News is by no means “extreme.” Forgette and
Morris (2006) find similar results using CNN’s Crossfire as a treatment and the traditional
political roundtable after a State of the Union address. Forgette and Morris show that
Crossfire’s effects on trust in politicians and government are negative and significant. Soft
news (i.e., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart) also decreases political trust, but increases
internal political efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006) which indicates that there can
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be differential effects expected under some circumstances. Finally, political talk radio—
a conservative, and almost uniformly extreme medium (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011)—is also
an independent variable of interest for political trust. Using the Gamson Hypothesis as a
theoretical construct, Hollander (1997) finds that political talk radio listenership has little
to do with political efficacy.
All of this research highlights one failing of the literature: there is no long-term gauge
on any one medium to see how its effects on trust change over time. Thus, there is no
established theoretical basis to expect any particular type of effect on political trust. This
means that even though there may be some significant findings at certain times with certain
media, we have no strong reason to believe that effect is constant or that it is not constant.
This project seeks to fill that void, particularly with regard to political trust.
Efficacy has an equally varied empirical trail, and the notion that media can affect trust
of efficacy is not completely verified by the literature. S. E. Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger,
and Bennett (1999) use the 1996 NES to predict trust in government for the mid-1990s. In
their models, neither political talk radio nor general media consumption significantly affected
trust in government. Similarly, Banducci and Karp (2003) investigate the link between media
and trust and efficacy using data from the United States, New Zealand, and Britain. For
the United States, attention to media was not a significant predictor for either trust in
government or internal efficacy.
Media and tone effects on efficacy are mixed at this time (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Mutz &
Reeves, 2005). Television is suggested as a deleterious medium for efficacy (Mutz & Reeves,
2005; Putnam, 2001). Mutz and Reeves (2005) find that incivility decreases efficacy,
while Baumgartner and Morris (2006) show that The Daily Show with Jon Stewart increases
efficacy versus a control. Research on political talk radio suggests that entire medium is
predicated on low levels of efficacy-leading to cynicism-as the radio becomes the outlet for
venting frustration with the political system (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Internet access
can increase external efficacy, but is associated with decreased internal efficacy (Kenski &
Stroud, 2006).
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4.4 Theory and Hypotheses
There is not yet a unifying theory on how media should affect political trust and efficacy.
As of today, the research is as scattered as it has ever been. Thus, there is fertile ground
for theoretical development and testing. My theory is as follows: Political trust should be
affected by extreme media in relation to the macro-political environment. Those who listen to
political talk radio under Republican presidential administrations as this media is primarily
a conservative medium-particularly in the time frame studied here. For extreme television,
trust should be decreased because the time period in this study where extreme television
is studied takes place in 2008. The financial crisis would affect the zeitgeist negatively for
either political party. Democrats will be made distrustful by extreme hosts because the Bush
administration was in power, while Republicans would be less trustful of government because
the government was intervening in the economy is serious and extensive ways. Internal
efficacy should be positive because these media will continually tell their audience how they
hold the true power, and that they should hold the government accountable. External
efficacy should also be increased among consumers of these media because they will make
the government seem more approachable to understandable to their audience.
With this theoretical perspective, I can make the following formal hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1 : Political talk radio should cause increases in political trust when a
conservative government is in power. Conversely, it should be negative when a liberal
or divided government is in power.
• Hypothesis 2 : Political talk radio should cause increases for internal political efficacy
and external efficacy because listeners are inundated with information about how they
are or can affect the government versus non-listeners.
• Hypothesis 3 : Extreme television media should cause decreased political trust, but
increased efficacy.
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4.5 Data and Methods
As is highlighted by the literature (see Finkel (1985) and Hetherington (1998) for ex-
tended discussions), isolating the effects of or on political trust and efficacy is notoriously
difficult. The rash of insignificant findings in cross-sectional work is due in part to endogene-
ity issues. Experiments are capable of locating causal mechanisms, but the few that exist
(i.e., Mutz and Reeves 2005) are not yet borne out in cross-sectional data examinations. A
primary reason for the null effects of media efficacy is the “one-off” nature of the research.
Many studies use only one year’s data in their study making generalizable claims elusive
(Hollander, 1995, 1997). Furthermore, there is no research testing extreme television media
on trust or efficacy at all. Thus, this area is primed for investigation.
A perennial concern for media studies is isolating the causal direction of the dependent
and independent variables. For instance, is it because one is conservative that one watches
FOX News, or is it because one watches FOX News that they become conservative? This
endogeneity problem is difficult to overcome. However, here-as in the previous chapter
on political knowledge—I employ matching to mitigate concerns about endogeneity. By
estimating a matching model with listening to PTR or consuming extreme political television
I can make causal inferences with cross-sectional data.
The dependent variables used in this chapter are taken from the National Election
Study for 1996, 2000, and 2004. For 2008, I use National Annenberg Election Survey data.1
Importantly, I am not estimating any pooled models. Each matching model will be done
with only that year. Thus, question wording differences are important caveats, but not the
fatal flaw they would be if I needed or wanted to estimate pooled models. The dependent
variables for trust in government in 1996, 2000, and 2004 are constructed from the NES
trust battery. This battery consists of four questions listed by their traditional shortened
forms: “Trust D.C.?,” “Waste Tax,” “Big Interest,” and “Crooked” (Craig et al., 1990;
Hetherington, 2005). This scale ranges from zero—meaning that the respondent does not
1The full question wording and coding scheme is in Appendix A.
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trust the government at all—to eight—meaning that the respondent has the most trust
in government. For the 2008 Annenberg data, I use their approximation of this question.
Their question simply asks, “Thinking about the federal government in Washington, how
much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government to do what is right:
always, most of the time, or some of the time?” They allow respondents to choose “never” as
well, so this variable ranges from zero to four. It has less variation than the NES measure,
but the underlying construct is the same. Furthermore, using only one or two of the trust
battery questions is common in studies on political trust (Hetherington, 1999), but—like
Hetherington—I seek to utilize the full range for the most leverage on the question.
For political efficacy, I do not use the entire NES battery. The reasons for this are three-
fold. First, there are only two questions per NES study in 1996 and 2000 to approximate
internal efficacy.2 In neither survey I use does the alpha coefficient for the scale exceed 0.41,
so there is reason to believe that those questions do not make a valid scale in the surveys I
use. Secondly, the NES omitted the questions used for internal efficacy in 2004.3 They no
longer asked if politics was “too complicated” for people like the respondent to understand.
Thus, I am unable to make any claims about internal validity at all. Finally, I use only the
“have a say” question for external efficacy because it is contained on all four surveys. So, the
internal efficacy question used is, “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated
that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.” The answers range from
zero, meaning strongly agree, to four, meaning strongly disagree, and the higher the number
the more efficacy the respondent exhibits. For external efficacy the question used is, “People
like me don’t have any say about what the government does.” Again, the answer choices
range from zero to four with the meanings the same as the internal efficacy question. The
questions and answers to the NAES are the same as the NES.
2For internal efficacy the question are as if one has “a say” in what government does and if government
“cares” about the respondent’s thoughts.
3For the 2004 NES, the external efficacy scale is robust. I estimated matching models on all of the
question, including the scale itself, and for all the dependent variables PTR is positive and significant. For
simplicity and similarity I only use the “have a say” question.
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4.6 Results
I begin by assessing the effect of political talk radio on political trust over a series of
election years. This study represents the first time this medium has been assessed over a
period this long. Two of the fundamental issues with previous research demonstrating null
results is the lack of a significant time span and the lack of controlling for endogeneity. I
mitigate both of those concerns here. In Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 the average treatment effects
(A.T.T.)4 for political talk radio on trust in government are demonstrated. In three of the
four election years in question political talk radio listening is a significant predictor of trust
in government. Two of the years, 1996 and 2008, the effect is negative. In 2004, the effect is
positive. This confirms my theoretical expectation that the macro-political environment as
a key explanatory role for noting the effects of this medium.
Table 4.1 Treatment Effects of PTR on Trust in Government in 1996, 2000, and 2004 (NES)
Year N. Treated N. Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
1996 579 954 -0.278 0.117 -2.37
2000 561 994 -0.141 0.159 -0.891
2004 471 595 0.391 0.128 3.056
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
In 1996 and 2008 the Democratic Party was either in the White House (1996) or con-
trolled a both chambers of the Congress (2008). As political talk radio is a consistently
conservative medium (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010) it makes sense that listeners to political
talk radio would have lower trust in the government. Talk radio hosts would be relentlessly
inundating their listeners with negative frames and information about the role of government
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). This is especially true in 2008 as dire warnings about the
4The significance of treatment effects is noted in two ways. The t-test, if greater than 1.96, indicates a
significant difference, but I have also made the significant effects bold.
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economy and the lack of government oversight allowed banks stand on the brink of collapse
as an industry. Thus, the treatment effects in 1996 and 2008 are expected. In 2004, however,
political talk radio significantly increases trust in the government. This is a novel finding,
but one that is theoretically expected given the state of the government in aggregate.
Table 4.2 Treatment Effects of Extreme Media on Trust in Government in 2008 (NAES)
Medium N-Treated N-Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
PTR 4462 7446 -0.033 0.010 -3.267
Extreme TV 311 10239 -0.087 0.055 -1.585
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
In 2004, George W. Bush and the Republican leadership in the Republican-controlled
Congress ran a phenomenally successful campaign (Brader, 2006). Understanding that
political talk radio is a conservative medium, we would expect that political talk radio hosts
would constantly reference the (Republican) government and highlight what a tremendous
job they did, particularly with reference to terrorism. The Bush campaign team made
reelection appeals based on how they kept the country safe after 9/11 a central component
of their strategy (Brader, 2006). Thus, while previous scholarship expected that political
talk radio as a medium would decrease trust in government (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997;
Hollander, 1997), I demonstrate here that it also increases trust under certain conditions
(i.e., a conservative government). This finding comports with our understanding of media
effects because the hosts on political talk radio would prime their listeners to trust the
government when there is a government with which the hosts have ideological agreement
(Graber, 2004).
Turning to the null results, we see that in 2000 political talk radio and in 2008 extreme
political television hosts5 have a negative, but insignificant, effect on political trust. In both
5These hosts are described in the previous chapter. As a reminder they are Bill O’Reilly (C), Chris
Matthews (L), Sean Hannity (C), Keith Olbermann (L), and Glenn Beck (C).
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instances, theoretically based explanations justify the null findings. In 2000, the incumbent
Democratic President was preparing to leave office. More than that, however, was that Bill
Clinton was not only a Democrat, but some suggest he was the primary catalyst for the
explosion of political talk radio as a legitimate genre (Barker, 2002; Jamieson & Cappella,
2010). So, as he was preparing to leave office, the main focal point for the ire and vitriol
coming out of political talk radio for nearly a decade is a lame-duck. Coupled with the
fact that the Republican majority coming out of the 1994 mid-term elections is no longer a
novelty, but a reality of American politics, conservatives and political talk radio hosts were
likely ambivalent about the degree to which they trusted the government. That supposition
is supported by the matching results presented here. Once again, conceptualizing of political
talk radio—or extreme media generally—as a monolithic entity loses the nuance of the role
these media play in the political system. Turning to the 2008 extreme television finding,
the results can be explained by the fact that this variable is not decided conservative or
liberal. There are more conservative host consumers coded because—particularly in 2008—
conservative extreme television hosts have a bigger presence on television than liberal hosts.
Thus, the negative effect can be explained. The null result generally is the explained by the
fact that the opposing ideological directions of the shows do not lead to a clear theoretical
explanation for this type of medium. The results for efficacy for these hosts are much clearer.
The results for average treatment effects on external efficacy are displayed in Table 4.3
and Table 4.4. Again, as with the effects on political trust, political talk radio is a significant
predictor of external political efficacy in 1996, 2000, and 2008. Consuming extreme political
television is also a positive and significant predictor of internal political efficacy.
Because political talk radio hosts consistently discuss politicians, issues, and ways the
government scholars have consistently looked for political talk radio to be positively associ-
ated with efficacy-both internal and external (Banducci & Karp, 2003; Hollander, 1997).
They have, however, been consistently bedeviled by insignificant findings. This results pre-
sented by the matching models estimated here suggest a reason for this empirical history.
Starting with 1996, the treatment effect is 0.216. The question used to measure external
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Table 4.3 Treatment Effects of PTR on External Efficacy in 1996, 2000, and 2004 (NES)
Year N. Treated N. Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
1996 579 954 0.216 0.078 2.758
2000 561 994 0.093 0.077 1.213
2004 471 595 0.251 0.111 2.259
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
efficacy in this study is the question that asks if the respondent feels as though they “have a
say” in what the government does. With a mean of 1.98 and standard deviation of 1.29, an
average treatment effect of 0.216 means that listening to political talk radio increased the
external efficacy of listeners over non-listeners by about 1/6th a standard deviation. While
this effect seems substantively small, it is impressive because of the myriad factors that we
know go into predicting external political efficacy (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Almond &
Verba, 1963; Finkel, 1985; Niemi et al., 1991). For 2000, external efficacy—like political
trust before—is insignificant. The sign is positive which indicates that political talk radio
influenced efficacy in the expected direction, but the insignificant is likely due to the ambiva-
lent nature of the macro-political environment at the time. In 2004, we see that the average
treatment effect is larger than 1996 at 0.251. The 2004 NES external efficacy question has a
mean of 2.43 and standard deviation of 1.40. Thus, the increase in efficacy for listeners over
non-listeners is roughly 1/6th of a standard deviation just as it was in 1996.
Table 4.4 Treatment Effects of Extreme Media on External Efficacy in 2008 (NAES)
Medium N-Treated N-Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
PTR 4462 7446 0.159 0.028 5.751
Extreme TV 311 10239 0.010 0.114 0.091
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
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Finally, to extend the effect of political talk radio to 2008, we see that the average treat-
ment effect is 0.159. The mean for the external efficacy question in the National Annenberg
Election Survey is 2.07 with a standard deviation of 1.51. Thus, the effect is about 1/8th
of a standard deviation. As with the other matching specification, this is a substantively
small increase in efficacy, but the fact that any one medium could significantly affect any
complicated attitude such as efficacy is an important finding. Consuming extreme television
media is statistically insignificant, but is signed in the correct direction.
External efficacy is only half of the story.6 Extreme media may also increase inter-
nal efficacy because of the constant discussion of political issues, actors, and institutions.
Consumers of these media may feel an increased ability to understand the system, actors,
and institutions. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show the average treatment effects for matching
models with the internal efficacy question as the dependent variable. This question asks if
respondents felt that the system was “too complicated” or “complex” in 1996, 2000, and
2008. Though these questions are often used as part of a scale (Finkel, 1985; Morrell,
2003) research shows that they measure the same underlying construct. I forego the use of
the efficacy scale in this study because the NAES does not use it. Even though I am unable
to compare studies, per se, I attempt to keep the dependent variables as close as I possibly
can when applicable.
Table 4.5 Treatment Effects of PTR on Internal Efficacy in 1996 and 2000 (NES)
Year N. Treated N. Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
1996 579 954 0.158 0.083 1.91
2000 561 994 0.208 0.098 2.116
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
In Table 4.5, the 2000 NES shows that listening to political talk radio has a positive and
significant effect on internal political efficacy. In 2000, those who listened to political talk
6Curiously, the 2004 NES time-series study does not have internal efficacy questions on the survey.
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radio were more likely than those who did not to feel the government was not too complicated.
The average treatment effect in this model is about 1/7th of a standard deviation. The results
from 1996 are insignificant, but positive which is in the expected direction.
Table 4.6 Treatment Effects of Extreme Media on Internal Efficacy in 2008 (NAES)
Medium N-Treated N-Control A.T.T. S.E. t-test
PTR 4462 7446 0.159 0.028 5.751
Extreme TV 311 10239 0.552 0.113 4.877
Note: A.T.T. is average treatment effect while using kernel matching
on all other variables with bias-corrected bootstrapped standard errors.
In Table 4.6 we have the matching estimations for 2008. The question used in the An-
nenberg study matches the question asked in the earlier NES surveys—“is the government
too complicated?” Only political talk radio has a significant effect on this question in this
year. The substantive effect of the treatment is roughly 1/10th of a standard deviation.
Turning to extreme political television, we see that the substantive effect of this medium is
greater than political talk radio. The effect of watching extreme political television signifi-
cantly increases internal efficacy about 1/3rd of a standard deviation. This is an impressive
increase for one medium. This suggest that despite the problematic issues that might arise
from increasing ideological polarization of media (Prior, 2007) there are potential benefits
as well such as increased internal efficacy.
As noted by the hypotheses, I expected that consuming extreme political media would
have nuances effects across election years given the macro-political environment. In general,
my theory has been supported. I find that political talk radio is positively related to trust
when there is a conservative government (2004), negative with a liberal or mixed government
(1996 and 2008), and insignificant when there is ambivalence as to the direction of the gov-
ernment (2000). External efficacy should be positivity increased by extreme media because
consumers of these media are able understand the actions of government and how they, as
citizens, may affect those decisions. This is confirmed for political talk radio in some years
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(2000, 2004, and 2008), but not extreme political television. For internal efficacy, extreme
media should increase this type of efficacy because viewers and listeners are constantly in-
formed by hosts about ways they can or have affected the government. This is confirmed for
both political talk radio (1996, 2000, and 2008) and extreme television media (2008).
4.7 Conclusions
Recent media effects research has decried the corrosive impact of extreme or outrageous
political media on the American political system (Berry & Sobieraj, 2011; Cappella &
Jamieson, 1997; Jamieson & Cappella, 2010; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). What these
works lose sight of is the fact that despite the appearance of harm, these political media
play an important role for those who consume it. Indeed, we have reason to be wary of the
language used in these media (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011) as it certainly does not conform
to the notions about how deliberation occurs in a democratic society (Habermas, 2006).
Nonetheless, to cast aspersions on these media as uniformly problematic is to overlook the
positive externalities that they provide. In the previous chapter I noted that these media
can produce political knowledge. In this chapter I establish that they also have a role in
producing or inhibiting trust in government, and that they almost always produce internal
efficacy and some external efficacy. These benefits of these media have yet to be explored in
the detail provided here.
The primary finding of this project is that extreme political media are important to
understand in today’s political environment. As these media become more bountiful, we
need to make sure that we understand the impact in a more holistic manner than we have
previously. Earlier studies either on political talk radio or the hosts I term “extreme” were
hampered either because they did not take into account the role these media play in the
system (i.e., their relationship to the macro-political environment) or they could not take
this into account given the scope of their study (i.e., usually one year or survey). I take both
of these factors into account and demonstrate findings where others were null. By using
matching I am able to overcome problems of endogeneity. Because I use multiple surveys in
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four successive presidential election years I am able to replicate my findings over the long
term to show the theoretical trends I expected. As with any study, this one is not without
caveats.
First, because the questions on the NES change over time, and because the Annenberg
survey uses only one external and internal efficacy question these findings much be tempered.
However, in terms of measurement, the questions I use are valid questions used over time
for studying efficacy (Morrell, 2003). Similarly, for political trust, I am able to use the
additive trust scale from the NES to estimate the effects for those models. Annenberg does
not have a trust scale, but rather a single trust in government question. So, the results do
not replicate in the strict sense, but again, the question used by Annenberg is known to tap
the same underlying construct as the NES scale.
Political knowledge, political trust, and efficacy are not the end of the discussion for
extreme political media. There is ample reason to believe they affect another important
political attitude: political tolerance. The picture of extreme political media I am painting
has thus far been one where extreme political media actually generate traits that we might
not associate with them. However, if there is an area where extreme political media are
likely to be troublesome it is in an area like political tolerance because the self-selection and
the type of language used in these media make them prime arenas for increased political
intolerance. So, for the next chapter, I turn to political tolerance.
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CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND EXTREME MEDIA
5.1 Introduction
Do extreme media affect political tolerance? Thus far in this dissertation I have demon-
strated that there are positive effects on political knowledge, and contingent effects on po-
litical efficacy and trust. To what degree can these media affect this important quality in
American democracy? This question is vital given the evolving nature of media in American
politics. Citizens are choosing increasingly “outrageous” content (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011).
The aim of these media outlets and personalities is both to disseminate information, but also
to push a particular point of view with a significant degree of bombast. Understanding the
ways these media affect citizens is difficult using traditional methods such as polls because
of the self-selecting nature of media consumption (Arceneaux et al., n.d.). Thus, to get
leverage on this type of research question an experiment is best, and is used here to test my
hypotheses.
This project is one of the first to examine extreme media effects. The current literature
shows that media outlets are becoming increasingly diverse generally and extreme outlets
are becoming increasingly important for American politics. An example of this increasing
diversity is Baum (2003a, 2003b) as he demonstrates that “soft news” (i.e., Inside Edition
or Oprah) has positive effects such as increased foreign policy knowledge and awareness of
political actors. Others investigate “high-conflict” media (i.e., argumentation between the
show host and guests) showing that television with higher levels of conflict significantly lower
trust in public officials, political parties, and institutions (Forgette & Morris, 2006). Mutz
and Reeves (2005) show that incivility in televised political discussion decreases trust, while
Mutz (2007) shows that incivility decreases the extent to which viewers consider oppositional
points-of-view legitimate.
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The missing research link in these studies on media effects on political attitudes are
1) research on newly defined extreme media, and 2) research on political tolerance and
political knowledge in the wake of consuming such media. This project utilizes a laboratory
experimental design to assess both of these points. I find that extreme media personalities
increase tolerance toward their preferred political groups, but there is no significant effect on
the ideological out-groups of the hosts used here. These findings have implications political
tolerance as we know it, and suggest that our understanding of media effects on political
tolerance is still evolving.
5.2 Political Tolerance and Its Individual-Level Determinants
Political tolerance is a key dimension on which normatively good democracy citizenship
is based (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993). Tolerance is the capacity to
respect heterogeneous beliefs, values, and opinions while still maintaining one’s own beliefs,
values, or opinions (Sullivan et al., 1993). Most research on political tolerance revolves
around the capacity for citizens to respect the civil rights of their “least-liked” or out groups
(Gibson, 1992; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981; Sullivan et al., 1993).
Understanding the conditions that mitigate or encourage tolerance is a vital endeavor. The
literature on political tolerance shows that there are a number of attitudinal and environ-
mental factors that can affect political (in)tolerance, and show that political tolerance is not
a static variable.
In his seminal work, Stouffer (1955) examined the extent to which Americans in the
1950s believe that communists should be afforded civil liberties in the United States. His
work demonstrated two key findings: 1) tolerance toward out-groups was not widespread and
the lack of it was predicated on the threat these groups represented, and 2) those who had
leadership positions—elites—had more tolerance toward these out-groups that those who
were not elites (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The finding that Americans
had little trouble or even a willingness to take away other citizens’ civil liberties was and
continues to be troubling. Other research suggests perhaps Americans are not as intolerant
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as Stouffer claimed, and that Stouffer’s results are based on his question wording and groups
used in his survey (i.e., communists in the 1950s).
Prothro and Grigg (1963) and McClosky (1964) both delve deeper into aspects of Stouf-
fer’s earlier work. Prothro and Grigg (1963) do so by investigating the degree to which
citizens in Ann Arbor, Michigan and Tallahassee, Florida support the institutions or “rules
of the game” by asking survey questions about minority rights and civil liberties. McClosky
(1964) interviews attendees to national parties conventions, and asks them questions gaug-
ing their level of support for civil liberties for their political opponents. In both cases, the
researchers replicate Stouffer’s earlier findings and they show that there are, “‘carriers of the
creed’ who protected the democratic system from the majority of citizens who did not fully
understand or support it” (Sullivan & Transue, 1999, p. 629). These early empirical tests
of tolerance in America show that it is not uniformly distributed and depending to whom
and how you ask questions about tolerance results vary widely.
Another way intolerance is demonstrated to be less pernicious than originally though
is when it is pluralistic in nature (Sullivan et al., 1993). This is to say, when there is
no clear “enemy,” but tolerance is decreasing in a society, there may be little reason to
believe intolerance will necessarily have deleterious effects. However, should an “other” be
established, intolerance will become problematic quickly (Gibson, 2007). Developing an
“other” becomes easier when values like social capital are on the decline because people have
less interpersonal trust (Putnam, 2001). Social capital, like other important predictors of
political tolerance, is an individual-level phenomenon. Thus, the individual-level predictors
of tolerance and intolerance are important variables to consider when assessing tolerance and
the ways in can be increased or inhibited in American politics.
The important individual level predictors of political tolerance are levels of democratic
values held by the individual (Sullivan et al., 1993), education (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Nie,
Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996), and perceived levels of threat (Altemeyer, 1996; Feldman &
Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Sullivan et al., 1993). When a person knows and believes in
the aforementioned “rules of the game” then they often have high levels of political tolerance
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that are not easily affected (Sullivan et al., 1981, 1993). These highly tolerant citizens are
usually elite or involved in community activity. It is also likely that they have higher levels
of education (Sullivan et al., 1993). Bobo and Licari (1989) use General Social Survey data
and show that for those with higher levels of education political tolerance of even their most
disliked groups is higher than for those with lower levels of education. This is the result
of knowing and learning about other points of view and having to consider them, but also
because through the education system students continually interact with others who may
not share their values (Nie et al., 1996). Thus, people who spend time in the education
system must also spend time becoming tolerant of others. However, of all these individual
predictors, arguably the most important is the perception of threat (Gibson 2007).
Sullivan et al. (1993) claim that a primary trigger for decreasing political tolerance for
any group is viewing that group as a threat. When threat perceptions are activated plu-
ralistic intolerance ceases and particularized intolerance can be established (Gibson, 2007;
Sullivan et al., 1993). Personality type plays an important role when the ways political tol-
erance can be increased or decreased when threats are perceived. Authoritarianism is shown
to be activated with increased perceived threat (Altemeyer, 1996; Feldman & Stenner,
1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), and as authoritarianism increases so does intoler-
ance (Stenner, 2005). The factor that links each of these factors together is that they are
exogenous predictors of political (in)tolerance. Human beings are often able to determine
the circumstances that produce the variables affecting values like political tolerance. This
is to say, there are situations where endogeneity plays a key role in explain the “spiral of
tolerance” (Gibson, 2007, p. 333).
Social networks have significant effects on levels of tolerance for political out groups
(Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004; Mutz, 2006). Though social networks are not com-
pletely endogenous1 people often group themselves among similarly minded people (Mutz,
2006). We know that when political discussion takes place within heterogeneous social net-
works, political tolerance is one of the by-products. Mutz (2006) shows that people who have
1You may choose your friends, for instance, but you cannot necessarily choose your co-workers.
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diverse social networks are more likely to have increased levels of tolerance for their political
out-groups. Discussants with homogeneous networks, however, will not have higher levels of
tolerance. One of the places where citizens are likely to encounter the most heterogeneity
is among their coworkers (Huckfeldt et al., 2004). The important aspect of diverse social
networks is political disagreement (Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Mutz and Mondak (2006) show
that in work-places where individuals are confronted with heterogeneous political ideas and
values the levels of political tolerance increase. Conversely, in homogeneous work-places,
political tolerance is not affected. These results mirror other work on diverse social net-
works and draw on earlier research on education: diversity in social settings breeds political
tolerance.
5.3 Media and Political Tolerance
Where do media fall in our understanding of how political tolerance can be inhibited
or produced? Issues of diversity in media consumption, and the ways people interact with
media may perform similar functions to social networks when considering political tolerance.
Perhaps those who agree with the host’s point of view will have their levels of tolerance
affected, but those who are ideologically different will exhibit higher levels of tolerance for
their out-group. This possibility has not yet been investigated with extreme media.
Research establishes that media frames can affect levels of tolerance (Nelson, Clawson,
& Oxley, 1997). Nelson et al. (1997) focus their analysis on the frames used by media and
the effect of those frames on tolerance. They show that free speech frames are effective at
increasing levels of tolerance for normatively abhorrent groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.
The Ku Klux Klan’s capacity to present a “threat” was downplayed, and their rights as
citizens (i.e., civil liberties) were used as the basis for their support. The news story produced
by Nelson et al. is a straight-forward, objective journalism style of media environment.
With the advent of more extreme types of television media mean that more investigation is
necessary to see if these new types of media play different roles than more traditional media.
The role of selective exposure is problematic when considering the way media can affect
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attitudes like tolerance. Dilliplane (2011), Iyengar and Hahn (2009), and Stroud (2008, 2010)
explore selective exposure in the increasingly polarized American media environment. All
three of these studies show that partisanship is a significant predictor of media selection,
and they all suggest that the attitudinal and behavioral results of this process are still
evolving. Mutz and Martin (2001), conversely, claim that even when taking into account the
capacity for citizens to self-select into ideologically similar media, media choices are often
more heterogeneous than the social networks in which citizens find themselves.
Mutz and Martin’s claims notwithstanding, the literature on media effects seems to point
to a new era of minimal effects (W. L. Bennett & Iyengar, 2008b). The supposed reasons for
this lay squarely with the increasingly polarized media environment (Prior, 2007). The fact
is, however, that we know media can affect political tolerance under certain circumstances.
What we need to know now are three things: 1) Can political tolerance affect the selection
of media choice?, 2) Is political tolerance changed once viewers select into their media?, and
3) How are levels of political tolerance affected when people are randomly assigned media to
watch?
5.4 Theory and Hypothesis
My theory is that extreme media should significantly increase tolerance for groups about
whom they speak positively. Media personalities may be able to increase tolerance because
they will use positive frames (Nelson et al., 1997) for those groups and issues. This will
be especially pronounced for extreme media because they use their personality and political
point-of-view as fodder for their content. Thus, conservative media should produce political
tolerance for ideologically conservative groups. Similarly, liberal media should produce polit-
ical tolerance for ideologically liberal groups. I will also test the hypothesis that conservative
media decrease tolerance for liberals, and liberal media decreases tolerance for conservatives.
The experimental design is identical to the previous chapters. The treatment groups
consisted of two videos showing a shortened version of Glenn Beck as seen on FOX News
while the other saw shortened clips of Countdown with Keith Olbermann from MSNBC. The
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clips are coded according to Sobieraj and Berry’s (2011) scheme based on “outrageousness”
or, as I term it, extremeness. Sobieraj and Berry define outrage as the degree and extent to
which hosts on opinion based news shows or political talk radio use ad hominem attacks or
hyperbolic language. I use the term extreme because these hosts present information in a
state of outrage, but are extreme when compared to traditional news media. Additionally,
clips of Glenn Beck and Keith Olbermann were selected for the following reasons: 1) Beck
and Olbermann are noted by Sobieraj and Berry as the most outrageous hosts in their study
period, and 2) both Beck and Olbermann have sufficient content on an important, salient,
but not recent political topic—Arizona’s immigration law.
My hypotheses are as follows:
• Hypothesis 1a: Watching extreme media will increase tolerance for those the host
supports, when compared to a control group.
• Hypothesis 1b: Watching extreme media will decrease tolerance for those the host
opposes, when compared to a control group.
• Hypothesis 2 : Watching host using extreme language will increase political knowledge
for the topics that the host discusses, when compared to a calm version of the host.
• Hypothesis 3a: Watching host using extreme language will increase tolerance for those
the host supports, when compared to a calm version of the host.
• Hypothesis 3b: Watching host using extreme language will decrease tolerance for those
the host opposes, when compared to a calm version of the host.
5.5 Data
The data were generated via a convenience-sample experimental pool at a large south-
eastern research university, from a mandatory course on the Introduction to American Pol-
itics. As demonstrated by the summary statistics in Table 5.1, the subjects skew toward
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traditional college age, are somewhat liberal, are more likely to be women, and half the sam-
ple is non-white (Black or African-American is the most common ethnicity among minority
subjects).
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics by Treatment Group, Fall 2011
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Control Group (N = 173)
White 0.421 0.495 0 1
Black 0.416 0.494 0 1
Latino 0.093 0.291 0 1
Male 0.41 0.493 0 1
Age 21.4 4.1 1 24
Olbermann Non-Extreme (N = 179)
White 0.244 0.43 0 1
Black 0.533 0.5 0 1
Latino 0.094 0.293 0 1
Male 0.45 0.498 0 1
Age 21.5 3.1 1 24
Beck Non-Extreme (N = 185)
White 0.351 0.478 0 1
Black 0.427 0.495 0 1
Latino 0.146 0.354 0 1
Male 0.448 0.498 0 1
Age 21.4 3.8 1 24
Olbermann Extreme (N = 187)
White 0.322 0.468 0 1
Black 0.47 0.5 0 1
Latino 0.154 0.362 0 1
Male 0.359 0.481 0 1
Age 20.7 5.4 1 24
Beck Extreme (N = 186)
White 0.37 0.484 0 1
Black 0.455 0.499 0 1
Latino 0.121 0.327 0 1
Male 0.407 0.492 0 1
Age 21.1 5 1 24
The dependent variable for this chapter is political tolerance. I measure political tol-
erance using the Sullivan et al. (1993) “least-liked” coding scheme (see also Sullivan et al.,
1981). There is a debate in the literature on the use of this measure, but it has demonstrated
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capacity to tap into levels of political tolerance (Gibson, 2007; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).
The dependent variable was measured post-treatment with a series of multiple choice ma-
trices. Subjects were asked to indicate their willingness (strongly agree to strongly disagree)
to let specific groups “teach in public schools,” “be out outlawed,” “make a speech in this
city,” “have their phones tapped by our government,” and “hold rallies in our city.” The spe-
cific groups used in each matrix are the “pro-immigration movement,” the “anti-immigration
movement,” “Conservative Arizona lawmakers,” “illegal immigrants,” and “United 21st Cen-
tury America.” These groups are specified because the policy area used in this project is
Arizona’s S.B. 1070. Four of these groups constitute real groups where the treatments might
be able to affect tolerance, whereas “United 21st Century America” is a fake group designed
to act as a base category.
5.6 Experimental Procedures
Subjects were offered extra credit for their participation, and were allowed to partici-
pate at their leisure for approximately one week. Most subjects were in the experimental
environment for at least one and one-half hours. Subjects were randomized into one of five
conditions where they were instructed to watch a video that appeared in the environment.
The videos were hosted on YouTube so that they would approximate likely online viewing
experiences, thus adding to external validity. There were four treatment conditions and a
control group. The control group was instructed to watch a video of a bird which has been
demonstrated in numerous experiments to not effect results in social science experiments.
The treatment groups consisted of two videos showing a shortened version of Glen Beck
as seen on Fox News while the other saw shortened clips of Countdown with Keith Olbermann
from MSNBC. The clips are coded according to Sobieraj and Berry’s (2011) scheme based
on “outrageousness” or extremity. Sobieraj and Berry define outrage as the degree and
extent to which hosts on opinion based news shows or political talk radio use ad hominem
attacks or hyperbolic language. Clips of Glenn Beck and Keith Olbermann, specifically, were
selected for the following reasons: 1) neither host is currently on a widely available television
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format, 2) Beck and Olbermann are noted by Sobieraj and Berry as the most outrageous
hosts in their study period, and 3) both Beck and Olbermann have sufficient content on
an important, salient, but not recent political topic-Arizona’s immigration law. The topic
of these clips is the Arizona immigration law (Senate Bill 1070) because immigration is a
salient topic, but one that can likely discern between politically attentive and inattentive
subjects. Furthermore, it presents characters for and against whom political tolerance is a
vital issue. Not only determining the amount of tolerance toward immigrants (illegal and
legal) or anti-immigrant protestors important, but knowing how media affect this issue is
interesting as well.
There are four total treatment conditions: “extreme” Beck or Olbermann and “non-
extreme” Beck or Olbermann. Each video was roughly three minutes and fifty seconds long,
and began with the typical introduction used by the shows as they appear on television.
Each video discusses the same information and uses both the host a several “cut-away” clips
of other individuals. Unlike other experiments (i.e., Mutz & Reeves, 2005), this project
seeks to examine these extreme media holistically. That is to say, the effect of these shows
is produced via the environment they produce by the introduction, guests, and the manner
in which the hosts discuss the information. Thus, I am not able to isolate any particular
aspect of the shows that contributes to any of the effects found; rather I focus on the
clips themselves. By using Glenn Beck, Keith Olbermann, and YouTube I am able to gain
increased external validity for this laboratory experiment. However, I am also limited in
terms of the types of causal claims I can make based on these shows. For instance, I cannot
isolate the particular words or phrases that contribute or inhibit increases in tolerance. This
is a limitation, but it is one that is required if we want to study real-life content, which always
contains multiple images and phrases. Randomization was accomplished in Qualtrics, and
the display in Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the subjects by condition. As seen,
randomization successfully balanced the subjects.
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5.7 Results
The data results only the treatment effects are reported with 90% confidence intervals.
Displayed in Figure 5.1 are the treatment effects on tolerance toward illegal immigrants.
The expectation is that Olbermann—as a liberal—would increase tolerance toward these
groups. Beck is expected to decrease tolerance. As shown, non-extreme Olbermann did not
have a statistically significant effect against the control group. However, both Beck non-
extreme and extreme mean tolerance scores are higher than the non-extreme Olbermann.
Extreme Olbermann does have a statistically significant effect in the expected direction.
This suggests that Olbermann’s extreme discussion of the Arizona illegal immigration bill
was able to increase the tolerance for illegal immigrants among subjects who saw that clip.
Figure 5.1 Treatment Effects on Tolerance for Illegal Immigrants
Figure 5.2 shows the treatment effects for anti-immigrant protesters. I hypothesize that
Beck should make viewers more tolerant toward this group with extreme Beck being the
most effective at increasing tolerance. As demonstrated, these results are insignificant at
each treatment, but the trends show that my theory and hypothesis may be correct. Each of
the Beck treatment means are higher than Olbermann or the control, but as none approach
significance there is little we can say. This may be an artifact of the experimental design, so
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as the design improves these results may become more substantial.
Figure 5.2 Treatment Effects on Tolerance for Anti-Immigrant Protestors
Figure 5.3 shows the results for the treatment effects on tolerance for pro-immigration
protesters. By comparing the control groups it is clear that tolerance for this group is
generally higher in this sample than for illegal immigrants. However, the same expectations
are present here, which are that Olbermann-especially extreme Olbermann-should increase
levels of political tolerance for this group. Once again, extreme Olbermann does have higher
levels of tolerance than the control group. Just as before as well, none of the other three
treatment groups have significant differences from the control. These effects need to be
investigated further, and will be discussed in more detail in the conclusions.
The primary point garnered from these results is that there is some reason to believe
that extreme media, despite claims to the contrary, may actually tolerance. Tolerance is
significantly increased only for those groups with whom the hosts agree, but it is notable
that there is no tolerance decreasing effect.
5.8 Conclusions
This project asks the question: do extreme media have significant effects on political
tolerance? This research suggests that extreme media can have some effect on political
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Figure 5.3 Treatment Effects on Tolerance for Pro-Immigration Protestors
tolerance in favor of the hosts preferred ideological direction, but that extreme media—
in this study—do not increase intolerance. This is an important first step in expanding
research on these new media. The Extreme Olbermann clip is demonstrated to increase
political tolerance for Olbermann’s preferred groups (illegal/undocumented immigrants and
pro-immigration protestors). Beck—both extreme and non-extreme—does not show any ef-
fect, and clearly does not decrease tolerance. The literature on media effects to this point
suggests that extreme media will likely decrease tolerance due to the way they discuss and
present information. This research shows that those assumptions need to be revisited. Ex-
treme media increase tolerance for the hosts preferred groups. These findings are important,
but limited at this time. There are several caveats that must be taken into account with
these data.
Firstly, these data are taken from a convenience sample and though these samples
are routinely used, questions of political tolerance are best tested with adult Americans.
Nonetheless, treatments with significant differences from the control group suggest that there
is an effect taking place and more work to be done investigating the implications. The next
step in the interest of external validity is to have non-student subjects for this experiment.
Next, these results are garnered from long (roughly 4 minute) clips of Glenn Beck and
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Keith Olbermann. I maintain that there is something important about the presentation and
affective intelligence produced by these shows, but testing the same messages via text will go
farther in determining if the results are the message or the messenger. Additionally, having
a broader array of clips will also help establish validity and demonstrate that the effect is
not contained within the clips on immigration shown here.
The final caveat is that these pilot data only test a minimal number of hypotheses.
Refining the experiment to take into account the framing of the issues for each of these
media personalities will give better leverage on the questions. At this time there is little
research done on the effects of these media types specifically, so this is a first step in that
direction. As research becomes more common we will be able to better tell if opinionated
mass media effects are indeed the same as media effects have always been, or if these new




The fundamental point of this dissertation is to explore the ways in which extreme me-
dia, both on television and radio, can affect political beliefs and attitudes. The attitudes
examined in this study are political knowledge, political trust, efficacy—both internal and
external—and political tolerance. As demonstrated in the preceding analyses, the story con-
cerning extreme media is more nuanced than previous described in both popular accounts
of their effects and the burgeoning political science literature in this area. Fundamentally,
extreme political media can encourage political knowledge. I demonstrate a correlational re-
lationship with cross-sectional data, a bias-tested causal relationship via quasi-experimental
means with propensity score matching, and with a direct causal relationship via a laboratory
experiment. The effects of extreme political media on political trust and efficacy are more
nuanced, as the macro-political environment is significant factor when considering effects on
those attitudes. Finally, the effect of extreme political media on political tolerance here is
null, which is an interesting finding, but one that certainly requires more investigation.
The crucial and over-arching theme of this project is that extreme political media are
not the bane of democracy as some have tried to frame them. American media routinely
point to new studies showing how some group or another who watches certain political tele-
vision programs are less knowledgeable than others (see Post, 2011; Rapoza, 2011), but
these claims are not rigorously tested. They have yet—before now—to be tested experimen-
tally to demonstrate believable causality. This is not to say that there are not normatively
problematic things that occur on opinionated cable news, or that everything that happens
on shows like Hardball with Chris Matthews is educational.1 Indeed, it is important to stay
1Glenn Beck made headlines in the summer of 2009 with his accusations of President Barack Obama being
a racist (Post, 2009). Chris Matthews has also made news with extreme comments concerning the political
benefits of Hurricane Sandy (Christopher, 2012). The point is despite these obviously uninformative and
biased statements, these shows still inform and serve a public good function.
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vigilant about the content of these media to ensure that none of them goes beyond the pale
too far or too often. However, for too long, people—scholars and popular media-watchers
alike—have been too willing to “throw the baby out with the bath water,” so to speak.
6.1 Main Findings
The main findings from Chapter 2 are that entertainment is an important quality when
motivated to seek out news. In an experimental setting where subjects are primed to seek
out news for a benefit gained from information acquisition, entertainment and ideology are
the two key factors in the thought process. Through subject interviews I am able to probe
the extent to which subjects felt that their news choices were biased, and I find that those
who choose ideologically similar news felt the information was not biased. However, when
ideologically dissimilar news was chosen, subjects felt the information was too biased to be
trusted.
In Chapter 3 I show that extreme political media can produce political knowledge.
I demonstrate this finding with experimental results, with a large-N cross-sectional study
using ordered probit, and with propensity score matching. Furthermore, these results are
consistent across four presidential elections and two media types: television and radio. This
chapter demonstrates that beyond anything else that extreme media may or may not do, at
the very least they can inform the public. To this point, the political science literature has
been dubious about this claim, but it has gone largely untested. By using three types of
analysis I am able to successfully demonstrate the educative capacity of extreme media.
Chapter 4 takes on the effect of extreme media on political trust and efficacy. For
political trust, extreme media can increase trust under some circumstances, while in other
years it is associated with less political trust. The primary reason for these differential results
is likely due to the general political climate. Additionally, these results generally stem from
using propensity score matching with PTR as the causal variable in an era when there was
divided government. Under such conditions, it is likely the case that media effects are more
subtle and partially attributable to the general political zeitgeist. For efficacy,
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For the last empirical chapter, Chapter 5, I find that political tolerance is not sig-
nificantly affected by the experimental settings in this project. There are several possible
reasons for this. One is that this project utilizes college student convenience sample. It
is likely that these individuals are simple highly tolerant already. The second reason null
results may be exhibited is that the video treatments are only four minutes. Future research
should engage non-student samples as well as use different experimental treatments to see
if political tolerance can be affected by extreme political media. In the case of this project,
there are no effects, but more research is certainly in order.
6.2 Final Thoughts on Extreme Media
This project is the first of its kind to take a longer, more substantive look at what I term
“extreme media.” Research on these media continues to grow, but it is too often piece-meal,
and lacks an overall look at both the types of extreme media—television and radio—as well
as the range of its effects. The fundamental aim of this project is to begin opening the black
box of these new media and demonstrate that they are not the bane of democracy that some
have suggested they may be. Indeed, there are problematic aspects of extreme media. When
Glenn Beck, for instance, is able to go on national television and call the President of the
United States a racist and then meditated on his statement it is possible that he convinces
some of his viewers (Reports, 2009). However, instances of such outlandish, absurd behavior
are rare.2 Most of the time these hosts get on the air, do their show, and people move on
with their lives. The point I am making with this project is that while doing their shows,
these new media outlets and personalities serve important democratic functions just as we
expect media should.
The fact is that extreme media are not all that new at all. They are new to the
modern American news scene after 60 years under the norm of objectivity, but they are
simply reversions back to the partisan press of the 18th, 19th and early 20th Centuries. The
2In an attempt to discuss while not conflating, during the Bush Administration Keith Olbermann had a
penchant for drawing conservative ire by calling President Bush a war profiteer and a liar for his adminis-
tration’s policies in Iraq. So, outlandish comments go both ways—conservative and liberal.
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partisan press played an important role for educating partisans about their candidates, issue
positions, and relevant issues for debate (Schudson, 2002). Extreme media are now doing
the same thing for Americans in the 21st Century. Certainly, this development is not without
its own problems. As discussed throughout, extreme media may have negative externalities
as well. However, the insinuation of recent research is that extreme media harken the death
knell of responsible journalism in the Unites States in favor of some ‘reality television’ version
of journalism that harms democracy. In this project, I believe I have started the process to
walk those assumptions back so that scholars can take a closer look at the not-so-different
media anew.
Future research should do longer term experiments in the field. Laboratory experiments,
such as those presented here, certainly inform our understanding of extreme media and their
effects, but field experiments are necessary if we are to get a handle on both the selection
aspects and the effects of these media in the American population. Additionally, examining
more than one policy area is an important step forward. In this project I focus only on
immigration. While immigration is a perennially important issue, there are other issues that
may exhibit different effects than the ones shown here. This should be examined. Finally,
developing a measurement of “extremity” is a long-range goal that needs to be accomplished.
As highlighted in Chapter 1, measures of media bias are myriad—if imperfect—but there
is no standard measure of extremity. I code the clips for my experiment based on previous
research and a coding scheme for language and body language. This scheme should be
expanded, made more standardized, and used for other hosts regardless of their “outrage”
classification. To conclude, this project shines light on a little studied, much discussed area
of political media; however, with the plethora of new areas to research on extreme media,
I have uncovered more questions than I could answer here. It is now the duty of political
science, as a field, to continue the work that began here.
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SURVEY QUESTION WORDING AND CODING
A.1 1996, 2000, and 2004 National Election Study
Kowledge (2004)1
“Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much
information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.”
“The first name is Dennis Hastert. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Dick Cheney. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Tony Blair. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“William Rehnquist. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Not looking at the booklet now. Do you happen to know which party had the most members
in the House of Representatives in Washington BEFORE the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
“Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate BEFORE
the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
2000
“The first name is Trent Lott. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“William Rehnquist. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1Question wording is the same across all years unless otherwise noted.
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1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Tony Blair. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Janet Reno. What job or political office does she NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives
in Washington BEFORE the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
“Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate BEFORE
the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
1996
“The first name is Al Gore. What job or political office does he now hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“William Rehnquist. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Boris Yeltsin. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Newt Gingrich. What job or political office does he NOW hold?”
1 = Correct, 0 = Incorrect
“Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives
in Washington BEFORE the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
“Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the U.S. Senate BEFORE
the election (this/last) month?”
1 = Correct (Republicans), 0 = Incorrect (Democrats)
Radio
“There are a number of programs on radio in which people call in to voice their opinions
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about politics. Do you ever listen to political talk radio programs of this type?”
1 = Yes; 0 = No
Income2
“[T]ell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your
family living here in [YEAR = 1995, 1999, or 2003] before taxes. This figure should include
salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.”
1. A. NONE OR LESS THAN $4,999; 2. B. $5,000-$9,9993; 3. C. $10,000-$14,999; 4. D.
$15,000-$24,999; 5. E. $25,000-$34,999; 6. F. $35,000-$49,999; 7. G. $50,000-$64,999; 8. H.
$65,000-$74,999; 9. J. $75,000-$84,999; 10. K. $85,000-$94,999; 11. M. $95,000-$104,999; 12.
N. $105,000-$114,999; 13. P. $115,000-$124,999; 14. Q. $125,000-$134,999; 15. R. $135,000-
$144,999; 16. S. $145,000-$154,999; 17. T. $155,000-$164,999; 18. U. $165,000-$174,999; 19.
V. $175,000-$184,999; 20. W. $185,000-$194,999; 21. X. $195,000-$199,999; 22. Y. $200,000
and over
Education
“What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? Did you get a
high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test? What is the highest degree that
you have earned?”
1. 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency; 2. 9-11 grades, no further schooling (incl.
12 years without diploma or equivalency) ; 3. High school diploma or equivalency test ; 4.
More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree; 5. Junior or community college level
degrees (AA degrees) ; 6. BA level degrees; 17+ years, no advanced degree ; 7. Advanced
degree, including LLB
Age
“Age was calculated by subtracting the year of birth from [YEAR: 1996, 2000, 0r 2004]. For
cases where R refused to give year of birth or year of birth was NA in the survey variable, a
check was made of Household listing information: if age of R was included in the Household
2Though the categories for the 1996 survey do not match these exactly, they were re-coded to match
these categories as closely as possible.
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listing, it was included here from the Household listing.”
Codes: 17 - 97, with 97 = 97 and older
Male
R’s sex is...
1 = Male; 0 = Female
White
“What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you?”
1 = White; 0 = All other
Ideology
“When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal,
slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely
conservative, or haven’t you thought much about this?”
0 = Moderate; 1 = Slightly liberal or conservative; 2 = Liberal or Conservative; 3 = Ex-
tremely Liberal or Conservative
National TV
“How many days in the past week did you watch the national network news on TV?”
0 - 7, coded as in NES
Local TV
“How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news shows such as ”Eyewit-
ness News” or ”Action News” in the late afternoon or early-evening?”
0 - 7, coded as in the NES
Newspaper
“How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?”
0 - 7, coded as in the NES
Attention to Politics
“Some people don’t pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you
say that you have been VERY MUCH interested, SOMEWHAT interested or NOT MUCH
interested in the political campaigns so far this year?”
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0 = not much, 1 = somewhat interested, 2 = very much interested
A.2 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey
Knowledge “Who has the final responsibility to determine if a law is constitutional
or not? Is it the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court? [Probe if don’t know:
Anything come to mind?]”
0 = President, 0 = Congress, 1 = Supreme Court
“How much of a majority is required for the US Senate and House to override a presidential
veto? [Probe if don’t know:] Anything come to mind?”
1 = Two-thirds, 0 = Other
“Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the United States House of
Representatives? [Probe if don’t know:] Anything come to mind?”
1 = Democratic, 0 = Republican
“To the best of your knowledge, do you happen to know how Supreme Court justices are
chosen? Are they nominated by a nonpartisan congressional committee, elected by the
American people, nominated by the president and then confirmed by the Senate, or appointed
if they receive a two-thirds majority vote of the justices already on the court? [Probe if don’t
know:] Anything come to mind?”
0 = Nominated by congressional committee, 0 = elected, 1 = Nominated by President and
confirmed by Senate, 0 = Appointed by two-thirds of justices
Radio
This variable is constructed based on two NAES variables. The first is an indicator of
listening to radio, the second confirms that the respondent listens to conservative talk radio.
If a respondent claims to listen to a host in bold they are coded as “1” with all other
respondents being “0.”
“Thinking about the past week, how many days did you hear information about the 2008
presidential campaign on radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events,
public issues, or politics? This includes hearing the shows on the radio, or on the Internet,
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your cell phone, iPod, or PDA.”
0 = 0
1 = 1 - 7 (indicates a listener)
Income
“Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people living in your house or
apartment? Just stop me when I get to the right category [read response options 1 - 9]:”
1 = Less than $10,000; 2 = $10,000 to less than $15,000; 3 = $15,000 to less than $25,000;
4 = $25,000 to less than $35,000; 5 = $35,000 to less than $50,000; 6 = $50,000 to less than
$75,000; 7 = $75,000 to less than $100,000; 8 = $100,000 to less than $150,000; 9 = $150,000
or more
Education
“What is the last grade or class you completed in school?”
1 = Grade 8 or lower 1 = Some high school, no diploma, 1 = High school diploma or
equivalent, 2 = Technical or vocational school after high school, 2 = Some college, no degree,
2 = Associate’s or two-year college degree, 4 = Four-year college degree, 4 = Graduate or
professional school after college, no degree, 4 = Graduate or professional degree
Age
“What is your age?”
18 - 97, 97 = 97 or older
Male
Respondent’s sex?
1 = Male, 0 = Female
White “What is your race? Are you white, black or African American, Asian, American
Indian, or some other race? [If Hispanic:] Are you white Hispanic, black Hispanic, or some
other race?”
1 = White, or white Hispanic; 0 = all other (Black, African American, or black Hispanic,
Asian, American Indian, Hispanic w/ no race given, mixed race, or other)
Ideology
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This is a folded ideology scale to assess the degree to which strongly ideological people gain
knowledge. There should be no difference with regard to the direction of their ideology.
“Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, somewhat
conservative, moderate, somewhat liberal, or very liberal?”
0 = Moderate; 1 = Somewhat liberal or conservative; 2 = Very liberal or conservative
Television
“Thinking about the past week, how many days did you see information on broadcast or
cable television about the 2008 presidential campaign? This includes seeing programs on
television, on the Internet, your cell phone, iPod, or PDA.”
0 - 7, matches NAES code
Newspaper
“Thinking about the past week, how many days did you read a newspaper for information
about the 2008 presidential campaign? This includes reading a paper copy of the newspaper,
an online copy, or a newspaper item downloaded on your cell phone, iPod, or PDA.”
0 - 7, matches NAES code
Attention to Politics
“How closely are you/did you follow the 2008 presidential campaign: very closely, somewhat
closely, not too closely, or not closely at all?”
0 = not closely, 1 = not too closely, 2 = somewhat closely, 3 = very closely
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Appendix B
MATCHING MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND BALANCE
Table B.1 Propensity Score Blocks and Balance for 1996 NES
Inf. Block of P-Score
Radio (treatment)
Total1 0
0 342 128 470
0.2 166 49 215
0.3 179 106 285
0.4 215 230 445
0.6 51 66 117
0.8 1 0 1
Total 954 579 1533
Note: This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated and
treated and the number of controls for each block for 1996.
Matched observables are Radio, Income, Education, Male, White,
Ideological, Nat TV, Local TV, and Attn. to Politics.
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Table B.2 Propensity Score Blocks and Balance for 2000 NES
Inf. Block of P-Score
Radio (treatment)
Total1 0
0 387 122 509
0.2 128 35 163
0.3 119 59 178
0.35 85 68 153
0.4 245 217 462
0.6 30 60 90
Total 994 561 1555
Note: This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated and
treated and the number of controls for each block for 2000.
Matched observables are Radio, Income, Education, Male, White,
Ideological, Nat TV, Local TV, and Attn. to Politics.
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Table B.3 Propensity Score Blocks and Balance for 2004 NES
Inf. Block of P-Score
Radio (treatment)
Total1 0
0 245 111 356
0.2 139 65 204
0.4 143 141 284
0.6 68 144 212
0.8 0 10 10
Total 595 471 1066
Note: This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated and
treated and the number of controls for each block for 2004.
Matched observables are Radio, Income, Education, Male, White,
Ideological, Nat TV, Local TV, and Attn. to Politics.
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Table B.4 Propensity Score Blocks and Balance for 2008 NAES
Inf. Block of P-Score
Radio (treatment)
Total1 0
0 929 529 1458
0.2 394 156 550
0.3 429 166 595
0.35 511 511 793
0.4 554 554 969
0.45 505 505 994
0.5 698 901 1599
0.6 214 321 535
Total 4,234 3,259 7,493
Note: This table shows the inferior bound, the number of
treated and treated and the number of controls for each block
for 2008. Matched observables are Radio, Income, Education,




***Countdown intro music and graphics***(0:00 - 0:06)
Olbermann: Good evening from New York; significant developments from Pima County
in embattled Arizona. The Sherriff of that jurisdiction, bordering Mexico, including the city
of Tucson, saying in our fifth story on the Countdown that he has no intention...(0:07 - 0:18)
***Graphic of state of Arizona with AZ flag and words “Racist, Disgusting, & Unnec-
essary” behind Olbermann***
Olbermann continued: ...of enforcing a law that he considers racist, disgusting, unnec-
essary. As at least three Arizona cities plus the Federal government contemplate lawsuits
to block the so-called breathing while Latino law, Pima County Sherriff, Clarence Dupnik,
joins us in a moment. (0:18 - 0:33)
***Cut to video of Jan Brewer signing a bill***
Olbermann continued: On the defensive, Arizona governor, Jan Brewer, taking a page
out of the Palin playbook turning to her Facebook page to lash out at critics and rationalize
the immigration law quoting the governor...(0:33 - 0:42)
***Cut to Facebook graphic, Olbermann reading text of Facebook post seen on
screen***
“On Friday, I signed into law Senate Bill 1070. Since then I have come under fire from
President Obama, Mayor Phil Gordon of Phoenix, the liberal east coast media, Al Sharpton
and others who want us to back down from securing our boarders. Rest assured, we will not
back down until our borders are secure.” (0:42 - 1:00)
***Back to Olbermann, Picture of Tom Ridge behind***
Olbermann continued: Even though nobody told her not to. President Bush’s Homeland
Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, who may know something about securing borders, telling
119
the Associated Press he’s uncomfortable with Arizona’s new law saying it allows police to
question people without probable cause...(1:01 - 1:15
***Cut to clip of Congressman Hunter, CA-R in House Chamber***
...and the son of former Congressman Duncan L. Hunter, who succeeded his father
representing the California 52nd now saying he would support the deportation of natural-
born American citizens if they were born to undocumented immigrants on the grounds that
they cost too much and because their souls are insufficiently American. (1:15 - 1:35)
***Cut to clip of Rep. Hunter***
Hunter (in video): We spend between 10 and 20 billion dollars in this state that we
spend on illegal immigration. Like he said that’s health services, education, and jails. We
just can’t afford it anymore. That’s it. We’re not being mean, we’re just saying it takes
more than walking across the border to become an American citizen. It’s what’s in our souls.
(1:35 - 1:57)
***Back to Olbermann***
Olbermann: Congressman Hunter, whose father once pointed to the glazed chicken as
proof of the good treatment at Gitmo, is proposing overturning the part of the United States
Constitution that conservatives are so fond of citing as defense against liberal tyranny. (1:58
- 2:12)
***Cut to image of Amendment XIV, Section 1-text***
Olbermann (reading text): The 14th Amendment, section 1, all persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (2:13 - 2:36)
***Cut back to Olbermann***
Olbermann: In Washington, Senators Menendez, Schumer, and Reid saying today they
will keep drafting immigration overhaul bill despite the fact that Republican Lindsey Gra-
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ham has pulled out of negotiations. Congresswoman Shelia Jackson-Lee, saying today that
Graham’s defection and promise to block immigration reminded her of the southern Dix-
iecrats who attempted to block civil rights legislation during the 1960s. Mrs. Jackson-Lee
and other House Democrats taking to the capitol steps today to condemn the Arizona law
calling for steps to fix it. (2:37 - 3:03)
***Cut to clip of House Democrats with Microphones at the Capitol***
Lydia Velazquez, (D): This bill will not make our borders more secure, but it will open
the door to discrimination and racial profiling. It panders to the worst elements of our
national dialogue. (3:03 - 3:21)
Barbara Lee (D): It is really a national disgrace-a national disgrace-that will result in
people being harassed simply because of how they look, and as an African-American I can
tell you that this opens the floodgates to racial profiling and to many, many, many of the
issues that we had to deal with during the civil rights struggle. Allowing law enforcement
officials to arbitrarily stop anyone, anyone and challenge their citizenship is not only wrong,
but it’s un-American. (3:21 - 3:55)
***END OLBERMANN TREATMENT CLIP*** Beck Treatment
***Beck intro music and graphics***(0:00 - 0:08)
Beck: President Obama said this about this legislation just the other day. (0:08 - 0:14)
***Cut to clip of President Obama, with Beck standing in front of screen in shot***
President Obama: This law that just passed in Arizona, which I think is a poorly
conceived law. (0:14 - 0:21)
***End Clip of President Obama, back to Beck***
Beck: Hummm, poorly conceived law. He would have been right if anything like the
law he described actually existed. Um, this is how he summarized his worry for Hispanic
Americans. (0:22 - 0:34)
***Cut to clip of President Obama, with Beck standing in front of screen in shot***
President Obama: Now suddenly, if you don’t have your papers and you took your kid
out to get ice cream, you’re going to be harassed. (0:34 - 0:43)
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***End Clip of President Obama, back to Beck***
Beck: Yeah, then there’s going to be a doctor who’s going to remove your feet and take
your kids’ tonsils out. Ahh, I mean if you’re here, you know, legally, illegally, you’re sitting
at an ice cream parlor they cannot ask you any questions by law. (0:43 - 0:58)
***Graphic behind Beck of state of Arizona with words ”AZ Senate Bill 1070”***
Beck continued: The law specifically prohibits such behavior. Enforce that law. It
applies to, to so many circumstantial limitations that it’s hard to imagine how systematic
abuse is even possible. Law enforcement will make a reasonable attempt to determine the
immigration status of a person when practicable if there is a reasonable suspicion, if it does
not hinder or obstruct an investigation, or if they have already been arrested. However,
the law states, race, color, or national origin cannot be the only reason they were asked.
Furthermore, any such interactions must be permitted by the United States or the Arizona
Constitution. It must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating
immigration, it must provide the civil rights of all persons, and the questioning must occur
during a lawful contact. (0:58 - 1:58)
***Graphic behind Beck with words ”Lawful Contact”***
Beck continued: That doesn’t sound like the ice cream parlor. What does lawful contact
even mean? According to the University of Missouri-Kansas City law school professor who
helped draft the law it means, quote, the officer is already engaged in some sort of detention
of an individual because he has violated some other law. The most likely context would be
that this law would come into play at a traffic stop. Arizona is in the midst of clarifying this
even further just to announce that their cops are not racists. So, unless your mythical trip
to the ice cream stand... (1:59 - 2:35)
***Graphic gone, Beck alone***
Beck continued: ...involves reckless driving or armed robbery, you’re probably going to
be okay with your mint chocolate chip waﬄe cone there with your grandkids. The larger
point, however, is that those who attack this law are making very specific complaints...(2:36
- 2:50)
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***Video of protestors plays in background as Beck continues; Signs say ”Veto SB
1070”***
Beck continued: ... about very specific groups people. It’s not about these people [points
to protestors in video screen], it’s not about the T.E.A. parties, or the anybody. It’s not.
Whom would be perpetrating this abuse? No critic is claiming that Republican politicians
are going to start making citizen arrests, or T.E.A. party members-oh, you’re Hispanic let
me arrest you. (2:51 - 3:11)
***Video of police stock footage behind Beck***
Beck continued: That’s not happening. What they are saying is that police officers will
abuse their powers to recklessly harass and detain Hispanic citizens for no reason other than
living while Hispanic. Why can we trust the police officers to make judgments on the use
of lethal force, but not ask for identification when appropriate? They are carrying guns.
It’s been my experience that police officers-and I think most people in America-along with
members of the military, police and members of the military represent the finest among us.
Not in every case. There are bad cops. There are bad...there are bad everything. (2:12 -
3:50)
***Beck alone, no graphic behind***
Beck continued: But the vast majority are just Americans; they’re good. They’re people
that risk their life every day to protect us. (3:50 - 3:56)
***END BECK TREATMENT CLIP***
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Appendix D
EXTREME TREATMENT MENTIONS AND NAES “EXTREME”
VARIABLE CODING
Table D.1 Experimental Treatment Explicit Mentions for Knowledge Questions
Treatment Condition
Question Olbermann Beck
Name of State 2 3




Question: Question EB02 c: “In the past week, from what television program did you
get most of your information about the 2008 presidential campaign?” Partisan coding follows
Dilliplane (2011).
Table D.2 Media Coding
Non-Extreme Conservative Media
FOX News (unspecified)
Fox Report with Shepard Smith
Special Report with Brit Hume





















NewsHour with Jim Lehrer





Table D.3 Media Coding, continued
Extreme Media (1)
Countdown with Keith Olbermann
Glenn Beck
Hannity and Colmes
















NewsHour with Jim Lehrer





Fox Report with Shepard Smith
Special Report with Brit Hume









                                                                                   
          papers     0.1461    0.7667    0.6232   -0.0231    0.0433             0 
           party     0.3443    0.4925   -0.6620    0.4301   -0.1253             0 
          number     0.5243   -0.3146    0.2417    0.4815    0.5796             0 
          brewer     0.5608   -0.2598    0.2401    0.0000   -0.7485             0 
           state     0.5203    0.0558   -0.2393   -0.7633    0.2936             0 
                                                                                  
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5   Unexplained 
                                                                                  
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp5        .557429            .             0.1115       1.0000
           Comp4        .703787      .146358             0.1408       0.8885
           Comp3        .905538      .201751             0.1811       0.7478
           Comp2        1.03511      .129576             0.2070       0.5666
           Comp1        1.79813      .763017             0.3596       0.3596
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000
                                                  Trace            =         5
                                                  Number of comp.  =         5
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =       614
Figure E.1 Principle Component Analysis for Political Knowledge
